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ABSTRACT
Name: John Kendall
Title: A place of life: On bioregionalism in East Price Hill, Cincinnati
Abstract: 
Bioregionalism has been an important theoretical framework within popular environmentalist
literature for over two decades. According to this philosophy, reinhabitation of “bioregions” will
commit  human  beings  to  a  natural  and  universal  knowledge  of  where  they  are,  thereby
holistically reconnecting  them with the  earth,  life,  and each other.  Troubling,  though,  is  the
meaning of “bioregion:” from the early environmentally determinist conception of Kirkpatrick
Sale  to  the  synthesis  of  landscape  and  consciousness  espoused  by  Peter  Berg,  framing  a
bioregion has  been murky even for  its  most  strident  apologists.  Even further,  from its  very
beginnings in early Western philosophy, the more general concept of place has been discussed
with no less ambiguity. Through a philosophical inquiry dating back to Aristotle, I argue that
bioregions  have  been  so  difficult  to  define  precisely  because  the  underlying  metaphysical
assumption of place—as something that is unitary, clearly demarcated, and differentiated from
other  places—is  erroneous.  The  texts  from  these  philosophers,  along  with  the  bioregional
practices  that  I  investigate  in  East  Price  Hill,  Cincinnati,  force  a  coming  to  terms  with  a
conception of place that is better understood as space qua difference. Place, in other words, is the
process by which space is intuited, differentiated, and represented by the living human subject.
But these representation that we eventually describe as “places” are not simply open to anyone's
interpretation: they are the spatial manipulation of hegemony, of power settled geographically. To
invoke place as such—as space qua difference—is to necessarily invoke a matrix of power that is
tasked with concretizing and making universal the arrangement of different places. Hence, what I
show  in  the  case  of  East  Price  Hill  is  that  the  politics  of  place-based  resistance,  e.g.  an
ecovillage,  always  already  invokes  a  dynamics  of  power—that  is,  Capital-Nation-State—
precisely by assuming a certain metaphysics of place. To upend the geography of the modern
social formation would require a new interpretation of the relation between place and space, one
not based on difference but on singularity.
Kendall 4
CONTENTS
Acknowledgments............................................................................................................................5
I.  Introduction
The Aporia of Place..............................................................................................................7
II. The Philosophy of Place
Framing Place....................................................................................................................15
Aristotle on Place...............................................................................................................21
Kant on Space....................................................................................................................30
Heidegger on Dwelling-in-Place........................................................................................36
Life-Place...........................................................................................................................42
III. The Politics of Place
Xenophobia & Solipsism...................................................................................................55
Negotiating Difference in New Cosmology.......................................................................61
Imago I: Seminary Square..................................................................................................75
Imago II: Enright Ridge.....................................................................................................96
IV.  Conclusion
A Preliminary Sketch on a Place-of-Life.........................................................................113
Appendix......................................................................................................................................122
Bibliography.................................................................................................................................128
Kendall 5
Acknowledgments 
Firstly, I would like to thank my family for all of their love and support. They may not
have  always  understood my academic trajectory—and I  certainly have  just  as  much anxiety
about explaining “Comparative Studies” as I'm sure they do—but they have been nothing but
supportive through all my endeavors.
Secondly,  I  would like to  thank my advisor,  Professor Joel  Wainwright.  Despite  only
knowing  him this  past  year,  I  can  say now in  hindsight  that  the  opportunity  to  work  with
Professor Wainwright has been the most influential and meaningful time of my undergraduate
career. To write a thesis under him was an incredibly gracious opportunity that went well above
and beyond what was to be expected. I would not have been able to come to the conclusions or
insight that I have reached in this paper without his mentorship. 
I would also like to thank the other members of my thesis defense committee, Professors
Nada Moumtaz and David Horn. Professor Moumtaz was my true introduction to the major of
Comparative Cultural Studies, and it was as a result of her class and my scholarly relationship
with her thereafter that writing a thesis ever even became a thought in my head. On the other
end, Professor Horn's enthusiasm for our department and wisdom over its true worth in academia
has  been  an  inspiration  for  me  as  I'm  sure  it  has  been  for  a  long  list  of  other  tentative
undergraduates. The department would simply not be the same without him. 
I am also deeply indebted to Jim and Eileen Schenk and their hospitality as they showed
around a poor, unkempt college student trough the ins and outs of Enright Ridge. The community
could not be more fortunate to be able to carry on the legacy of such kind, gentle, and loving
people. I would like to additionally thank all of the good, giving folks at Enright Ridge who,
despite all of the challenges, continue to believe that another world is possible and to live as if
the earth mattered.
Kendall 6
 
Kendall 7
I. Introduction
The Aporia of Place
This research began as a social science investigation into the presence of an ecovillage in
East  Price  Hill,  Cincinnati,  known  as  the  Enright  Ridge  Urban  Ecovillage  (ERUEV).
Ecovillages, as described by Gilman, are “human-scale, full-featured settlements in which human
activities are harmlessly integrated into the natural world in a way that is supportive of healthy
human development, and which can be successfully continued into the indefinite” (1991: 10). I
had  originally  intended  to  perform  research  of  this  particular  ecovilalge  through  the
confrontation of a core concept of living in an ecovillage: bioregionalism. According to Dodge, a
bioregion is  etymologically a  “life  territory,  place  of  life,  or  perhaps  by reckless  extension,
government by life” where the “central element” is the “importance given to natural systems,
both as the source of physical nutrition and as the body of metaphors from which our spirits draw
sustenance” ([1981] 2007: 341). For Dodge—though, it is important to note, by no means for
every  bioregionalist—the  'region'  of  bioregion  is  best  defined  through  an  assemblage  of
distinctions  including  “biotic  shift,  watershed,  land  form,  cultural/phenomenological,  spirit
presences,  and  elevation”  ([1981]  (2007):  344).  The  other  central  elements  that  constitute
bioregionalism according to Dodge are “anarchy” and “spirit” ([1981] 2007: 344-345). Hence,
bioregionalism  is  the  practice  of  synthesizing  and  concretizing  regionalism,  anarchy,  and
spirituality into a new politics of place.
In one way or another, all of these elements have found there way into East Price Hill.
Region was  the  easiest  to  see,  for  all  of  the  practices  intended to  localize  and situate  each
individual life into a knowable, livable place which everyone held in communion. This was the
Kendall 8
intent of the community-supported agriculture program; it was the intent of the permaculture
workshops, the seminars on ecological sustainability, the potlucks, the community newsletters,
the retrofitting and greening of houses, and virtually every practice Enright Ridge has performed
since  2004.  Several  original  members,  in  fact,  had  been  active  in  bioregional  forums  and
congresses across the country, so thinking in terms of “life territory” was indeed historically and
spatially prevalent. Spirituality was also a clear element of their founding, probably most evident
by the fact that upon my first arrival to the ecovillage, I was handed a book entitled What Does
God Look  Like  in  an  Expanding  Universe?  edited  by Enright  Ridge's  founder,  Jim Schenk
(2006).  Within  this  collection  of  essays,  there  is  an  attempt  to  rework  Western  Christian
metaphysics to be in better harmony with the earth and build toward a new cosmology. 
The last element, anarchy, was more difficult to find. I came to the conclusion that this
was not because it did not appear, but because insofar as it does, it subsumes into a larger, more
dominating structure that explicitly forbids it. Hence, the ecovillagers, even the most anarchist
among them,  work  jobs  in  the  city,  own private  property,  and—like  the  rest  of  us—openly
practice various forms of exclusion. The ecovillage, I learned, is not for everyone: it is not for
those suspicious Appalachians that roam around in the forest behind Enright Ridge, and its ethic
rootedness is contradictory to the “influx of transient renters” that had impeded the founding of
an ecovillage in East Price Hill prior to the arrival of Enright Ridge (Schenk 2006:1). It is not as
if  the ecovillage lacks self-critique to this  point,  however.  Faherty (2014), while noting how
white the ecovillage appears against ethnic heterogeneity of the surrounding community, also
quotes the conscious desire of an ecovillager to address this issue: “I just need to walk over with
a plate of cookies and say: 'Hi, my name's Jeff, and this is what we are doing over here.'” Such a
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response,  I  felt,  does not seem to address a racism that  is  deeply and profoundly historical,
geographical, and structural. The element of any sort of political and/or radical systemic critique,
let alone anarchism, seemed to be at best silenced if not entirely absent. Rather, the discourse in
Enright  Ridge  played  toward  realpolitik,  where  critiques  of  state  violence—race-,  class-,  or
gender-based—if at all considered, would turn more potential white, middle-class members off
than it would make the ecovillage more viable.
As a result, my research began as a kind of lambasting of the always-present oppression
of the poor and people of color and the overwhelming insufficiency of any response to this
problem in ecologically-oriented communities, even among those bleeding heart liberals who
should  undoubtedly  'know  better.'  I  feared  the  “misanthropic  strain,”  noted  by  Bookchin
(Bookchin and Foreman 1991: 16) originating in deep ecology that finds itself ever-present in
environmentalism today, so much of which is taken up by lamenting the population problem and
speaking of 'carrying capacity.'1 It is this kind of willful ignorance of social theory and gleeful
indifference to the plight of the oppressed that led someone like Dave Foreman, a figure so
critical for the early environmentalist movement Earth First!, to urge letting 'nature' seek out its
own balance and allow Ethiopian children to starve (Foreman 1991: 43). The Marxist critique of
Greenpeace Canada, 1971-2000, by Harter (2004) rang true for me upon the reading of its very
title: “Environmental Justice for Whom?” Hence, I felt that social justice was indeed being lost
in the pursuit of environmental justice, that structures of power were obscured in the quest to
'save the Earth,' and no clearer example could be found than in a white, guilt-laden, middle-class,
amd college-educated “eco-refuge” (a term from Verstraeten & Verstraeten 2014). It seemed as if
1 Bioregionalism is by no means saved in this specific call toward 'carrying capacity.' See Taylor 2000 as well as 
Figure 5 in the Appendix.
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underlying class and race relations had been all  but forgotten through rashly sublating  every
crisis with some mystical spirituality, leaving all believers dedicating their entire lives to the
Earth First! slogan: “No Compromise in the Defense of Mother Earth!” 
But to wholly condemn environmentalism in general or Enright Ridge specifically, I have
concluded, is a shallow and hypocritical approach. It is shallow in the sense that, again, the only
thing I confront by such a polemic is Enright Ridge as it appears to me, an outsider, bringing to
bear the full weight of a global structure onto a handful of environmentalists in Cincinnati and
shouting at them “not good enough!” As a result, I myself would lose sight of the personal and
spiritual transformation of so many people there on their genuine desire to treat others and the
earth with dignity. On top of this, such a critique is hypocritical: Yes, it is true, a collection of 80-
100 people trying to live in sustainability are not upending racism nor capitalism in one night—
but who, exactly, is? Who am I, after all, to come into Enright Ridge and complain that they are
not being radical enough? How am I exactly—coming from a public, land-grant university quite
heavily invested in imperial science, with my possibility of research made possible precisely by
the system that I so deeply lament—contributing to 'resistance' here?
Instead of writing the project off, I looked deeper for the anarchist element. I remember
receiving  a  CrimethInc  zine  a  few  years  ago  that  tried  to  simply  and  succinctly  explain
anarchism. It read: 
You may already be an Anarchist. It's true. If your idea of healthy human relations is  
dinner with friends, where everyone enjoys everyone else's company, responsibilities are 
divided up voluntarily and informally, and no one gives orders or sells anything, then you
are an anarchist, plain and simple. The only question that remains is how you can arrange 
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for more of your interactions to resemble this model...Anarchism is naturally present in 
every  healthy  human  being.  It  isn't  necessarily  about  throwing  bombs  or  black  
masks...The root of anarchism is the simple impulse to do it yourself: everything else  
follows from this (“fighting for our lives: an anarchist primer”: 4).
Enright Ridge is certainly anarchistic in this sense, but the truth is also that the capacity to be an
anarchist, the ability to arrange “more of your interactions to resemble this model” has so far
seemed quite limited. Enright Ridge is at best, after all, marginal 'resistance' with respect to a
global structure—as are the anarchist communes in rural Virginia, the Zapatistas, the Kurds in
Rojava, and any other more pronounced radical group aspiring to the status of revolutionary. 
To try and explain Enright Ridge as 'marginal' then became my task. Why, in other words,
does 'anarchism' never take the center? What interested me especially about Enright Ridge is that
the inner workings of bioregional  practice could be identified spatially as it  interacts  with a
power settled geographically. Perhaps, I considered, my contribution to 'resistance' in writing this
paper could be in the expounding of this particular relation as it manifests in space and place.
Thus, the question shifted from “why is Enright Ridge failing with respect to social justice?” to
“why does Enright Ridge exist in space the way that it does?”
To this end, it is my personal conviction that any sufficient answer to this question will
only emerge through continued critical and theoretical reflection. To do this, any aspirations that
this could be a scientific paper had to be dropped. What is defined below is well departed from
any kind of social science, although a Marxist framework still reveals itself in the third chapter
when discussing the politics of place. The intent, however, has shifted from that of a normative
critique of Enright Ridge, centered around race and class relations, to one that attempts to present
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a  political  ontology  by  considering  the  possibility  and  extent  of  resistance  given  a  quite
penetrating and globalized modern social formation. This is best described in Karatani's model of
Capital-Nation-State which will be explained in depth in the third chapter. It should be sufficient
to say here, though, that what I attempt to say with respect to the direct politics of place is that
bioregionalism in theory becomes markedly different  in  practice in  East  Price Hill,  and this
transition is evident of its imbrication into a political geography of difference subordinate to
capital, nation, and state. Enright Ridge, in other words, could only exist as it does insofar as it
remains marginal.
This is partly due to the fact that bioregionalism as such is directly antagonistic to the
fundamental tenets of the world system. Verstreaten and Verstraeten (2014) somewhat echo this
point:
The actual dominant development paradigm of perpetual progress and global market  
economy and the supporting representative democracy failed to establish social justice  
and wellness for all and destroyed the sustainability of the planet. In consequence, the  
ideas of the [Enlightenment] Era and its  rationale clash with the frontiers of Earth's  
ecological sustainability (786).
But it is critical to remember that it is not simply the ideals of the Enlightenmnet Era; it is the
entire structure of modernity—that is, the modern social formation of Capital-Nation-State. Most
directly  and  apparently,  environmental  sustainability  is  counter  to  the  capitalist  mode  of
exchange.  There  cannot  be  sustainability on a  finite  world  that  is  governed by a  system of
relations that by definition demands accumulation and compound growth. But what Karatani
does by including Nation and State into a Borromean knot of all three is to say that no extension
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of this  trinity could exist  without  the other  two. Thus,  in what follows (chapter three),  how
capitalism antagonizes  bioregionalism is  explained,  but  I  also  attempt  to  heed attention  and
critique to every part of the modern social formation.
I realized, however, that even such a political ontology is insufficient to answering the
question of why Enright Ridge exists  in space the way that it does. To approach this question,
one  must  consider  the  concepts  of  space  and  place  in  all  of  their  respective  metaphysical
standings. To do so, however, as I will show in chapter two, is unsettling. Upon investigating the
philosophies  of  space  and  place  from Aristotle  to  Kant  and  onward  toward  Heidegger  and
Harvey, I came to the conclusion that such concepts are alarmingly difficult to resolutely define.
Given  the  overarching  social  formation  of  Capital-Nation-State,  the  furthest  I  believe  it  is
presently possible to reach is to say that place is space  qua  difference, but this leaves wholly
open and unanswerable the concept of space—this is not the end of the story, however, as we
shall see in chapter four. Kant, it seems, was the first in this line of philosophers that rightly
identified space as something that exists beyond what is knowable, as beyond and anterior to
representation. This unanswerability is what I have come to define as the aporia of place.
This leads to a quite debilitating problem when I try to speak of a politics of place in East
Price Hill. Place, it appears, relies on a concept which cannot be known as such, and yet all
involved—ecovillagers, theorists, and myself—speak of place as something which is knowable.
How is this possible? I hope to show that the aporia is not by any means resolved but only ever
covered over. The problem of difference that exists by virtue of us being subjects, living bodies
distinct from each other, is hence contained—or, rather, ignored—by appealing to an assumed
commonality,  whether  it  be  in  the  shared  nexus  of  money,  the  state,  or,  today  in
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environmentalism, 'Mother Earth.' All of these require a degree of unfreedom, of asymmetry and
the subsumption of all under one particular view of one particular subject. At the same time, as
we  shall  see  in  the  case  of  East  Price  Hill,  one  in  practice  tends  to  'win  out'  despite  the
aspirations toward others, and that is the common social formation of Capital-Nation-State. In
the case of Enright Ridge, this is done so through the geographic distribution of 'places' which
marginalizes  some  and  makes  central  others;  and,  insofar  as  Enright  Ridge  is  an  act  of
bioregional resistance, it is compelled to such spatial rearrangement just the same. Its 'place' is on
the margins,  and this is all  it  could ever be given its inherent antagonisms to the prevailing
structure. Hence, in sum, the problem of place is wholly, unnervingly aporetic, the gap or 'doubt'
of which is a position assumed by power and settled geographically.
What started out as social science has thenceforth aspired to be poetry. For better or for
worse, this is all I could ever have hoped to write.
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II. The Philosophy of Place
Framing Place
Before I can begin to discuss the problem of place, there must be a firm understanding of
the  language and literature  of  place  that  will  be  deployed.  Though what  will  be  seen  lying
beneath bioregionalism is a theoretical and practical problematic far beyond the present detailing
of  its  origins,  illuminating  the  intellectual  history  of  some  of  the  pertinent  concepts  will
nevertheless help as a first step in grounding this 'transparent' framework of place within which
the  answers  to  place  have  been  proposed.  I  say  'transparent'  here  because  always  running
alongside this metaphysics and any subsequent semiotics—as occurs in every single reference to
place in this chapter—a theory of place 'feels' detached, floating over the corpse of whatever
each text theorizes to be lying there 'in place'. Transparency thus denotes that always something
seemingly lies beyond—or, perhaps, nothing, but a nothing that makes the framework of place
no  less  dubious.  The  transparent  framework  is  hence  in  itself  unsatisfying  and,  somewhat
ironically, the feeling of transparency here is an effect of the aporia of place. What I mean by this
is  to  say  that  the  feeling  of  detachment,  of  permeability  and  uncertainty  hints  at  the
unanswerability of place. Philosophical investigation does not triangulate but the exact opposite:
it throws us; it makes us no more understandable of what we try to signify when we say, “place.”
The transparent quality and discomfort of what will  be the suggested framework is  a
deliberate nod to Marx's phrasing of commodity fetishism as  gespenstige Gerganstandlichkeit
within the social process under capitalism—originally translated into English as 'phantom-like
objectivity' but corrected by Heinrich (2012), among others, as one that is 'spectral.' This term,
according  to  Heinrich,  while  often  attributed  to  Marx  as  some  sort  of  stylistic  ornament,
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nevertheless penetrates quite deeply into his comments on political economy: 
...with these descriptions Marx took aim at a central issue of the critique of political  
economy, namely, that the naturalization and reification of social relationships is in no 
way the result of a mistake by individual economists, but rather the result of an image of 
reality that develops independently as result of the everyday practice of the members of 
bourgeois society...'the bewitched, distorted and upside-down world' (Capital, 3:969)...is 
not only the basis of everyday consciousness, but also constitutes the background for the 
categories of political economy (34-35).
Heinrich demands that the reader go beyond such a reduction of Marx and attempt to confront
the so-called 'spectral value-objectivity' that forms the basis for commodity fetishism. To do so,
though,  a reader  already familiar  with 'Marxism' must  first  'unlearn'  commodity fetishism as
being simply some sort of mirage, like it is wool over the eyes of the masses. It is not as if
laborers are simply being duped by a false sense of reality in abiding by the apparent social
relation between things, but instead they are abiding by reality as such; they abide not by pure
falsity but what actually exists. Falsity implies that there is a delusion or distortion of what
'really' exists, but commodity fetishism, as explained by Heinrich is just as 'real' as any other
aspect of the social process. Secondly, the reader must acknowledge that fetishism here is not
abnormal: it is neither a peculiarity nor aberration but a direct consequence of a particular way of
being. Commodity fetishism must then finally be seen as appearance in the most specific sense:
it  results  from  an  image  that  is  imbued,  perpetuated,  and  practiced  through  the  everyday
consciousness  of  bourgeois  society,  and  it  is  an  image  that  frames  the  very  categories  of
economic and political understanding under capitalist society.
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Hence,  qualifying  value-objectivity  as  specifically  'spectral'  denotes  that  what  is
conventionally considered objective is both 'real' and yet not necessarily apparent as such: “they
are always there, specters,” as Derrida explains, “even if they do not exist, even if they are no
longer, even if they are not yet” (1993: 221). Furthermore, the commodity, the entombment of
spectral value-objectivity in capitalist society, exists as a 
'thing' without phenomenon, a thing in flight that surpasses the senses (it is invisible,  
intangible, inaudible, and odourless); but this transcendence is not altogether spiritual, it 
retains that bodiless body which we have recognised as making the difference between 
spectre and spirit (1993: 189).
This is a quite difficult line of thought to follow, but the spectral quality of a commodity is a
fundamental  component  of  both  the  overarching  thesis  and  my  “method”—using  the  term
loosely—within the first chapter. Insofar as this section asserts the transparency of frame in the
problem of place,  it  follows a similar anchor  to what  above was described by Heinrich and
Derrida as 'specter,' only now abstracted toward apparent metaphysical space as such. Now, I do
not mean to say that the social processes under capitalism do not have serious consequences for
the political representation of geographical difference. I only here make the more metaphysical—
and, hence, beyond political—claim that place, in Derridian jargon, is always there, even if it is
not represented as such, and to verify the impossibility of the articulation of its nature exceeds
the political scope, whether analyzed within historical materialism or otherwise. 
Despite the best efforts to define space by sense, theory, experience, or practice, space
remains, to quote Hegel, “sensuous non-sensuousness and a non-sensuous sensuousness” (qt. in
Miller 1970: 30). Space is, in other words, something that can be sensed insofar as it does not
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possess the attribute of sensuousness, and, at the exact same time, space is something that cannot
be sensed insofar as it possesses the attribute of being able to be sensed. Unlike Hegel, though, I
am asserting that such a claim does nothing to better familiarize the nature of space but only
highlights its impossibility. Space is not here an objective claim but always already involving the
sensory experience of the subject. The dialectic is spelled out but altogether meaningless; space
is truly its own self-externality, and this signifies epistemic trouble—most immediately at the
metaphysical level but also necessarily at the political one—when the subject attempts to address
space through the convention of place.  That is,  'place'  is 'space'  in the truest  sense: it  is the
sensory/non-sensory intuition of space always already through the prism of the subject. 
This  leads  me  to  the  conclusion  that  speaking  of  'space'  in  the  ontological  sense  is
aporetic. To properly talk about space—or, rather, space-in-itself—one would have to come to
terms with 'space' before oneself 'becomes' a subject, prior to sensibility and reasoning. I cast
much doubt over whether or not this is possible since speaking of the pre-subjective, the nascent,
infancy, and so on always comes from the standpoint of the subject. But even if it was possible to
come to terms with space-in-itself, we could not translate such a characterization  as such into
language,  for  language  is,  of  course,  representation.  Hence,  when  space  does  come  to  be
represented, I argue that it is never intuited as space but already differentiated into places. This is
because we, as living human bodies, do not intuit the absolute, the totality of space, but instead
we come to terms with particular spaces which we deem to be places. To speak of absolute space
is to speak of places prior to representation. Nevertheless, space is the fundamental kernel of our
representations; it is the concept that we intuit and represent as places, but it is no less aporetic as
a result.
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My strategy for approaching place in such a way was first inspired by Heidegger's essay
“The Age of the World Picture” (1977) in which he describes the “opening up” of a “sphere” as
the “fundamental event in research:”
[It is] accomplished through the projection within some realm of what is—in nature, for 
example—of a fixed ground plan [Grundriss] of natural events. The projection sketches 
out in advance the manner in which the knowing procedure must bind itself and adhere to
the sphere  opened up.  This  binding adherence is  the  rigor  of  research.  Through the  
projecting of the ground plan and the prescribing of rigor, procedure makes secure for  
itself its sphere of objects within the realm of Being (118).
Upon investigation of the extant research, the first task in this section is thus to work 'backwards'
and determine the nature of this particular ground plan for 'explaining' place as an ostensibly
'real' phenomenon in the world. The first task is thus, in the precisely Heideggerian sense, to
declare and solidify the image from which I sought to embark and perform research at Enright
Ridge. In doing so, though, an immediate impasse is reached where place itself will appear as
spectral, as something that, when turned to, vanishes into thin air. Hence the act of 'looking up'
toward a Grundriss through review of the extant literature will ultimately prove fruitless, where
what is presented below is rather a kind of critique and unsettling of framework in the very
hermeneutical act of identifying it. Rather than a scientific deduction of a rigid, robust theory of
place, the second chapter is only the negative confirmation of its aporetic absence.2
2 To be absolutely clear, by no means should this analysis of relevant literature stand for a rigid logical development
of the theory of  place which ends in bioregionalism, and neither  should this  review leave the reader with the
conclusion of such a theory's absolute, definitive impossibility. A direct consequence of my thesis is to insist that
such a gesture in either direction—place is possible or place is impossible—is erroneous if not entirely deceptive
with  respect  to  what  place  actually  is—the  problem  of  place  is,  as  such  and  at  least  under  the  prevailing
metaphysics, unanswerable. Moreover, the entire purpose of the initial proposal of a ground plan is to deconstruct it:
to not look past it or transcend it, at least for the present moment, but to exploit and make unsettling its gaps, to first
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What follows in this section should not be taken as a linear, cohesive intellectual history
of  all  or  most  investigations  into  the  problem  of  place.  Not  only  has  this  already  been
accomplished with a great deal of breadth (Casey 1998); moreover, too much gravity toward that
particular project would be a disservice to fully answering the primary question of this paper:
that is, why, under the particular lens of bioregionalism, does an ecovillage in East Price Hill,
Cincinnati exist as it does. The magnitude of such a task like Casey's work The Fate of Place
(1998) far exceeds the scope of the present paper and its pursuit is not mine. Rather, what I hope
to highlight are several previous attempts within the general category of thinking about place—
of which terms, colloquially similar if not completely identical, are continuously redeployed and
re-defined—that will in turn allow me to problematize the above-mentioned ground plan, that
“fundamental event of research” that precedes any method or procedure. Indeed, what follows
should do less to ground the reader in a stable knowledge of place than it should make him or her
uncomfortable by making fully aware the lingering anxiety in place's unanswerability. 
This chapter is therefore an attempt to doubt the very theoretical framework that it seeks
to discover and establish. This may seem rather hopeless or nihilistic, but it must be recalled that
the eventual task here is no postmodern incredulity with hands thrown up and a concession to the
impossibility of knowing anything about place. My final gesture here (chapter four) is to appeal
for a rebirth of a new metaphysics of place. The current section asserts that, without first coming
to terms with the prevailing metaphysics of place and, even further, the mechanisms of power
which act to sustain a particular hegemonic conception of place underneath an antagonistic and
contradictory  practice,  theories  of  place  and  their  residual  impact  in  place-based  social
come to terms with and embrace its transparent quality.
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movements will be condemned to running 'in place'.
Aristotle on Place
The  philosophical  discussion  of  place  for  my purposes  begins  with  Aristotle  (1996).
Place, for Aristotle, “takes precedence of all  things” (208a35).  All that follows, even change
itself, assume an answer to the question of where. In Book IV of Physics, Aristotle subsequently
attempts to define place. Importantly, this is a book divided between two main concepts: first,
topos, or place, and second, chronos, or time. It is also critical to note that nowhere in Physics
does  Aristotle  carry  on  a  similar  task  of  theorizing  choros,  or  space;  in  fact,  and  in  direct
challenge to Plato's cosmology which speaks of space as, firstly, “total implacement” (Casey
1998: 41), it must be said that Aristotle here has no concept of space. For Aristotle, the intrinsic
relation is not between time and space but time and place: whereas “'motion' “in its most general
and primary sense is change of place” (208a31-32), “time is 'number of movement in respect of
the before and after'” (220a24-25). Both claims will be considered in depth, but suffice it to say
at present that, in the single event of a body in motion, Aristotle contends that the physicist must
confront both place (where the body was against where it is after movement) and time (when the
body was against when it is after movement).
Discussing the latter concept of time, in typical Aristotelian fashion, Aristotle proceeds
through a series of deductions of what time is not in order to end up with what time therefore
must be. Firstly, he considers whether time could be thought of as a divisible thing with parts
ceasing  to  exist  and  others  not  yet  existing  (218a1-10).  Beyond  the  tumultuous  nature  of
considering a thing that partially does not exist as existing within reality, Aristotle rules out this
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concept of time even more convincingly by arguing that time, though divisible, is not in fact
constitutive of sequential 'nows,' for 'now,' the presumed quantum of time existing in reality, “is
not a part: a part is a measure of the whole, which must be made up of parts” (218a7-8). The
'now' is no divisible part of time, in other words, because it only ever exists in the present and,
hence, is certainly no measure of the whole, for time also consists of what ceased to be and
presumably what has yet to come. 
Moving through other possibilities, Aristotle rules out the concept of an infinite present—
that  is,  one  and  the  same  “now”that  always  exists—by  insisting  that  time  indeed  can  be
terminated and cannot be considered as simultaneously occurring 'nows' between today and, say,
10,000 years ago. If it were, then the thing of time in reality—'now' —would exist precisely
where other distinct 'nows' exist, and thus would make the conception of time as something that
exists  an  impossibility,  for  if  something  exists,  then  it  must  be  so,  according  to  Aristotle's
worldview, that it exists where and when nothing else does. In addition, Aristotle rules out time
as the “sphere of whole thought” itself, for this “view is too naive for it to be worth while to
consider the impossibilities implied in it” (218b7-8). Though Aristotle doesn't further specify, it
may be helpful to suggest here that, if time were the sphere of the whole of thought, then, first, it
would have nothing necessarily to do with motion, which Aristotle asserts it must. Second, time
would be purely and dependently human, which presumes a relationship with the subject by
which  is  both  anachronistic  to  Aristotle,  and,  more  critically,  directly  contradictory  to
Aristotelian thought.  Such a conception of time, in other words, anticipates the notion of an
idealist subject which is not yet present in Aristotle. As shall be shown, Aristotle will insist on
the convention of time as involving something which we might today denote as a 'subject' if we
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desire to send this concept back into the past. But by no means is it compatible to an Aristotelian
worldview to say that time is purely human fancy or only contained within the whole of human
thought.
Though from lines 218b1-5, Aristotle also rules out time as being the movement of the
whole, the extended consideration of this theory in relation to the subject forms the basis for his
argument of what time actually is. First, Aristotle argues that: 
part, too, of the revolution is a time, but it certainly is not a revolution: for what is taken 
is part of a revolution, not a revolution. Besides, if there were more heavens than one, the
movement of any of them equally would be time, so that there would be many times at 
the same time (218b1-5).
By “revolution,” Aristotle is referring specifically to the revolution of the heavens around the
earth. When considering the human experience of time, part of any one revolution is taken as “a
time,” but a revolution in total is not time. If one were to measure the movement of a whole
revolution, then it would have to be admitted that there was no net change in place and, hence,
no movement. Thus, the whole of movement is not time; a revolution is part of this whole of
movement and yet it is not time precisely because it is not change. The heavens are a perpetual
constancy, the parts of which exist in time but the whole is timeless. Aristotle does not entirely
abandon  this  consideration,  though,  but  instead  he  insists  that  although  time  is  not  simply
movement or the whole of movement, it  is also true to say that time does not exist  without
change: “Hence time is either movement or something that belongs to movement. Since then it is
not movement, it must be the other” (219a8-9). What is now left to decipher is in what way time
belongs to movement.
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Drawing from his earlier deduction from time as the whole of human thought, Aristotle
contends that time is something that we experience and this experience is fundamental to its
nature. This leads Aristotle to the conclusion that “time is not movement but only movement in
so far as it admits of enumeration” (219b2-3).  Time is never subjective but instead an attribute
of motion waiting to be realized. “Time is not number with which we count,” Aristotle says, “but
the number of things which are counted, and this according as it occurs before or after is always
different, for the 'nows' are different” (220b8-10). Number here is not a human convention but a
discovered truth of the universe; we do not 'speak' time, but we realize or acknowledge it as it
occurs. Time is thus for Aristotle the capacity for movement to be counted, not simply the act or
ability of humans to count. 
The predicament of place which precedes the above deduction of time in Book IV proves
no less of a hassle. Aristotle first claims that place both exists and is something that must be
distinct from bodies:
water is now, there in turn, when the water has gone out as from a vessel, air is present. 
When therefore another body occupies this same place, the pace is thought to be different 
from all the bodies which come to be in it and replace one another. What now contains air
formerly contained water, so that clearly the place or space into which and out of which 
they passed was something different from both (208b4-8).
In addition, place should not only be considered something, but a special something that exerts
influence, for the elementary natural bodies have natural places to which they will always go if
uninterrupted: fire and air flow up, earth and water fall down (208b19-22). These directions are
places for Aristotle, or at least elements of place, and they do not exist only in relation to us but
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our sensibility changes depending on  our own orientation which is acquired from  them.  Fire
flows in the place that is up whether or not our sense of up aligns with the distinctly natural place
that is up. Hence, according to Aristotle, in the first instance, place is distinguished from time as
something that exists entirely naturally and a priori. Place's existence, in other words, does not
rely on an analogous concept to that of enumeration for time; place precedes all other things.
But what is the nature of place? Aristotle lists four possibilities: place is either shape,
matter, extension, or boundary (211b5-9). First, he reasons that it cannot be shape, for “the form
[or shape] is the boundary of the thing, the place is the boundary of the body which contains it”
(211b12-13). A cup, for example, may be in the shape of a cup, and thus the boundary of the
thing that is the cup, but the cup itself is not its own place. The shape of the cup does not contain
the cup, so to speak, but merely its form. In addition, the place of water is not the cup but within
the cup: the cup is only its boundary of form. Secondly, Aristotle argues that place cannot be
extension for this does not actually exist other than as a characteristic of a body. If place did exist
as extension and as something beyond a characteristic of its body, “there would be infinity of
places  within  the  same thing”  (211b19-21).  The  example  Aristotle  gives  is  that,  if  place  is
considered  extension,  then  when water  and air  change place  within  a  vessel  then  what  lies
between extremities itself would necessarily undergo change, and these too would be in other
places and, hence, would require “another place which is the place of the place, and many places
will be coincident” (211b24-25). Thirdly, Aristotle contends that matter cannot be place because
matter  “is  neither  separable  from  the  thing  nor  contains  it,  whereas  place  has  both
characteristics” (212a1-2).  Thus,  place must  be boundary,  or,  more precisely,  “the innermost
motionless  boundary  of  what  contains  is  place”  (212a20-21).  Note  that  place  is  not  only
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motionless, though, but the very orientation of movement, for motion, as described earlier by
Aristotle, is at its most fundamental the change of place.
A peculiarity of Aristotle's thought on this point deserves some scrutiny. Recall that time,
according to Aristotle, consists of the possibility of movement to be enumerated, and hence is
presumably reliant  on the  act  of  counting  as  performed by something or  someone with the
capacity to count. Aristotle considers this as a logical extension to his definition of time at the
end of Book IV: 
But if nothing but soul, or in soul reason, is qualified to count, there would not be time 
unless there were soul, but only that of which time is an attribute, i.e. if movement can 
exist without soul, and the before and after are attributes of movement, and time is these 
qua numerable (223a25-29). 
The existence of time is conditional to its ability to be considered as such. Time is, simply put,
not  only  quantitative  measurement  but  active  quantitative  measurement;  it  is  movement
accounted for by something or someone.
Place, though, as stated previously, does not hold a similar relationship with agency. As a
boundary,  place is  indeed relational  but  not  to  humans:  rather,  it  is  derivative to  the spatial
arrangement of the cosmos itself.  Aristotle explains this in terms of the directionality of places: 
Hence since the light is what is naturally carried up, and the heavy is what is carried  
down, the boundary which contains in the direction of the middle of the universe, and the 
middle itself, are down, and that which contains in the direction of the outermost part of 
the universe, and the outermost part itself, are up (212a25-29). 
This  distinction  is  in  part  used  to  determine  the  'natural'  places  of  bodies,  but  it  is  also  to
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distinguish place as a thing that exists but does not move. Additionally, though the places of the
cosmos are boundaries whose coincident bodies constitute the cosmos, this  cosmos itself,  or
what he equates as the All or the heaven, is said not to be anywhere. According to Aristotle, for a
body to be anywhere—to be in some place—necessitates other places where this body cannot be,
and since the All is everywhere and nothing is outside, the All is nowhere.
Why,  then,  should  Aristotle  consider  the  All  to  exist  if  it  does  not  exist  anywhere?
Moreover, if indeed the All does not exist, to what extent is it truly possible to say that any of its
constituent parts exist? To some degree Aristotle anticipates these questions, for immediately
following his investigation into the All, a body which is no place, he discusses the void, a place
with  no  body,  and contends  that  the  void  does  not  exist,  for  if  it  did,  nothing could  move
(217b20-25). The void might be comfortably defeated, but the same question pertains to the All:
if the All is no place, and a condition of movement is to change place, how can anything move?
Internal to Book IV at least, the All contradicts existence by failing to meet the very parameters
that Aristotle deduces are necessary in order for something to be considered existing. In the first
few sentences of “Book IV,” Aristotle insists that “things which exist are  somewhere (the non-
existent is nowhere)...and...'motion' in its most general and primary sense is change of place”
(208a33-35). The All does not exist anywhere in particular. 
In this sense, the concept of the All inversely resembles Aristotle's initial deductions of
the nature of time: whereas it is erroneous to consider time as a divisible thing with parts ceasing
to be and parts not yet existing, the All does not exist in any place but is made up of parts which
do. Moreover, since time is based upon movement which is itself based upon the relation of
bodies changing places, it is against Aristotelian logic to attribute time to the All, for the All,
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being nowhere, cannot change place and hence cannot move. Thus, the All has no sense of time
and does not exist anywhere, and yet the All is what contains all things and, as where things
necessarily move, is a precondition for the consideration of time. 
What Aristotle means when her references the All is, specifically,  space and all of its
contents. Though he implicitly denounces Plato and the Timaean story of the evolution of choros
into topos, absolute space as ending in implacement, Aristotle still appeals to the All, a concept
that is space-like. Space in this sense is merely the boundary of everything, a kind of place of all
places. But what is important to note is that it is impossible for the All to exist as such, for to be a
place according to Aristotle, again, means to be a boundary between bodies, and 'absolute space'
is not by any means a boundary. In the attempt to abstract from the immediate recognition of
places arranged by the cosmos, in the attempt to 'speak' for 'space' in the concept of the All, what
we resort to is an impossibility. 
A necessary condition of place as defined by Aristotle is that space does not exist as any
sort of thing—the All is only a collection of places. If space were to exist as something in the
universe, it would either be a void, a place without a body, which he contends does not exist
(217b28),  or  a  place of places,  which is  itself  merely a larger  place with larger  boundaries.
Hence, space as absolute or abstract cannot exist in compatibility with Aristotle's conception of
place specifically because Aristotle's worldview is dependent on relations and not absolutes. But
if absolute space does not exist, I argue, then neither can place, for place has no place to be if the
All, or space, does not exist anywhere. This is our first insight into the aporia of place.
It would appear as if the 'answer'  to the unsettling nature of the relationship between
space and place is  simply to apply a similar process as Aristotle did with time: to deny the
Kendall 29
existence of the All as such, as something that exists, and that this is an erroneous understanding
of space, where space is actually only merely the possibility of different places. If time is the
before and after  of movement  qua  numerable,  then place should be construed as space  qua
difference.  This  designation would allow for two things: first,  it  would remove the assumed
though impossible nexus of absolute space, for space qua difference cannot appeal to any sort of
universal thing or ground, merely the difference between two places. This confirms the relative
nature  of  an  Aristotelian  worldview.  Secondly,  space  qua  difference  appeals  to  human
convention  as  reflective  of  inert  characteristics  of  space  in  the  same logic  as  Aristotle  had
performed with time. Differentiation, in other words, becomes an aspect not of any subjectivist
or  idealist  capacity  to  'speak'  the  world,  but  instead  space  qua  difference  embarks  on  a
preliminary sketch of the fundamental relationship between space and the subject. In the same
sense that numerability is a characteristic of the world but only active insofar as it is recognized
by someone who can enumerate, difference becomes an attribute of the world only apparent by
someone who can differentiate. Following Aristotle, if we are to consider time to be enumeration
—not the number which we count but the “number of things which are counted” (220b8-9)—
then we must accordingly consider place as not simply a cosmological spatial arrangement, and
neither as pure human convention, but instead as constitutive of differences within space in itself
as recognized by humans. 
But  the difficulties  by no means cease here,  for  if  place is  not  boundary but  instead
difference, and if difference necessitates a being which can differentiate, then place is no more of
a thing existing in the world than is time. Like enumeration, then, and staying true to Aristotelian
philosophy,  difference  is  a  kind  of  dormant  attribute  of  movement  only  awoken  by human
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experience,  and if  no soul  were here to  differentiate,  there would be no time and no place.
Having  already negated  eternal  Time  and  then  absolute  space  as  not  actually  existing,  this
understanding would mean that, insofar as time and space (or place) constitute reality,  nothing
would be sans human experience. The full confrontation of this difficulty within the relation
between space and human beings arrived few thousand years after Aristotle in the writings of
Immanuel Kant.
Kant on Space
Kant applies a similar process to that outlined above—that of considering space in the
same way Aristotle does time—directly within his early writings. The difference is that, for Kant,
space  qua difference is an intuitive basis for all  representation by virtue of us being particular
bodies. Our orientation as bodies within space—as one body among and in relation to many
others, intuiting space and time by way of this difference—is fundamental to our understanding
of everything. The regions of space, or places, are hence concepts represented to us by way of
our senses and reasoning, mimicked by our bodies, which in turn only carry meaning because we
are oriented and mutually related.
Rather than do away with the notion of absolute space, though, Kant instead asserts that
space, along with time, is the fundamental  a priori conceptual nexus to which we necessarily
orient.  Nevertheless,  he concedes that  it  is  a  relation “which is  such that  it  cannot  itself  be
immediately perceived” ([1768] 1929: 25). Hence, absolute space is not “an object of an outer
sensation,  but  a  fundamental  concept  which  first  makes  all  such  sensations  possible,”  and
“whatsoever in the outline of a body exclusively concerns its reference to pure space, can be
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apprehended  only  through  comparison  with  other  bodies”  ([1768]  1929:  28).  What  Kant
contends with respect to Aristotle, then, is that space cannot be considered as the All,  not as
Plato's 'total implacement'—for it exists as such prior to understanding. Yet space always already
associates with what appears to us: regions, or places, are relational with respect to this absolute
space. Hence, place now appears not as the cosmological arrangement of boundaries but indeed a
differentiation which we are compelled to by virtue of us being bodies among other bodies,
'grounded,' so to speak, in the unknowable precondition of absolute space. Respresentations of
'our' places, 'our' regions, and, indeed, our 'cosmos', in other words, always necessarily relate to
that which lies beyond: space-in-itself. 
Kant was aware of this problem at the time of his dissertation in 1768. He notes in the
conclusion of “On the First Ground of the Distinction of Regions in Space” that, though space
can  be  considered  “no  mere  fiction,”  the  understanding  of  absolute  space—that  which  lies
beyond and anterior to our representation—is unnervingly difficult  if  not outright impossible
([1768] 1929: 28). Kant posits that this difficulty:
arises when we attempt to philosophise on the first data of our knowledge. But it reaches  
its maximum when, as in this case, the consequences of an assumed concept [that of  
spatial relations as subsequent to and dependent on the relations of bodies to one another]
contradict the most obvious experience. ([1768] 1929: 29) 
This  passage  rather  ambiguously  highlights  the  impasse  of  the  problem  of  place:  though
“obvious experience” eludes us to believe we are submerged in absolute  space,  with spatial
relations apparent and real, space as we 'know' it is a coordination of our bodies in relation to
others, that is, place. Conversely, place appears to us, but it is dependent on a concept which,
Kendall 32
Kant asserts, we cannot know and hence we may expect to doubt. It is hence not that the All or
some eternal  Time should be rendered here as  wholly senseless  concepts,  but  rather  that  an
investigation into their respective relationships to place and time expose an aporia within the
whole nature of being. It is an aporia neglected by Aristotle simply by denying one of its two
conditions, making time dependent above all on the absolute, cosmological differentiation of
places, but it is an aporia recovered and revealed here by Kant. The attempt to “philosophise” on
the  “first  data”  forces  us  into  contradiction  with  our  immediate  experience  and,  moreover,
highlights  the  inadequacy  in  such  conceptions  and  the  unsettling  limits  of  pure  reason  to
distinguish what we think of as “space” or “place” from the thing-in-itself that is space.
Kant likewise contests the German idealism that had surrounded him: “The new way of
ideas is undercut—or at least suspended—as recourse is taken to what had been almost entirely
neglected by the subjective idealists of the previous century and a half: the living human body”
(Casey 1998: 203). Now we can finally say that, with respect to Aristotle more precisely, what
Kant does here is penetrate the understanding of motion as change of place, instead insisting that
motion is in fact subsequent to and dependent on the appearance to us of its 'attributes:' time as
enumeration and place as difference. The problem of place is an aporia between our very sense
and experience of reality as living human bodies and the presumed conceptualization of it as
something beyond. Place is understood as difference, but 'difference of what?' is aporetic; it is
referencing a 'what' that cannot be as such yet nevertheless is. The “what” of place, in other
words, is unanswerable.
The problem of subjectivity, the body, and their relation to the 'what' is one that plagued
Kant well into his career, finding itself arise again in the Critique of Pure Reason:
Kendall 33
The sensible faculty of intuition is really only a receptivity for being affected in a certain 
way with representations, whose relation to one another is a pure intuition of space and 
time  (pure  forms  of  our  sensibility),  which,  insofar  as  they  are  connected  and  
determinable in these relations (in space and time) according to laws of the unity of  
experience, are called object. The non-sensible cause of these representations is entirely 
unknown to us, and therefore we cannot intuit it as an object; for such an object would 
have to be represented neither in space nor in time...Meanwhile we can call the merely 
intelligible cause of appearances in general the transcendental object, merely so that we 
may have something corresponding to sensibility as a receptivity. To this transcendental 
object we can ascribe the whole extent and connection of our possible perceptions, and 
say that it is given in itself prior to all experience. But appearances are, in accordance 
with it,  given not in themselves but only in this experience, because they are merely  
representations,  which  signify  a  real  object  only  as  perceptions,  namely  when  this  
perception  connects  up with  all  others  in  accordance  with  the  rules  of  the  unity of  
experience ([1781] 1998: 512-513).
Kant  writes  this  introduction,  it  is  important  to  recall,  as  a  critique  of  both  the  claims  of
empiricists to 'know' that which truly is by way of senses and the positivists who claim to 'know'
that which truly is by way of reasoning. Recall also that place, at the time of Kant's writing, was
not  a  question  mark  for  many.  After  the  introduction  of  Cartesian  space  as  the  immediate
background by which events existed at mere locations and not as situated in some special sense
of place, the question of where is reduced to a matter of determining coordinates. There were at
this point mainly Newtonian absolutists and Leibnizian relativists. Casey describes the scene:
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By the end of the seventeenth century place has been disempowered, deprived of its own 
dynamism. It has become at best an inert 'part' (Newton), a mere 'modication' (Locke), of 
a superintendent and universal Space. And space itself, serenely void of place, retains  
dimensionality alone as an abiding structure of its own extensiveness. All one can do with
dimensions  of  height,  breadth,  and depth  is  to  fill  and measure them, or  at  least  to  
measure with them, that is, to determine distances between particular points in a neutral 
field...The grid of analytical geometry becomes the gridlock of physical space itself.  
Thrust  into  the  limbo  of  a  purely  passive  space  regarded  as  impassive  but  not  
impassable, place is rendered vacuous (of) itself, freeing the field for the building of sites
—themselves evacuated of any significant content (1998: 200-201).
Rather than follow either empiricism or positivism down this road, Kant contends that what we
know is that which is represented to us on condition of us being living bodies. Kant makes not
only an epistemological claim, but one that is simultaneously ontological. That is, in claiming
and qualifying the thing-in-itself as the transcendental object, Kant ventures into a knowledge
beyond  what  is  presently  knowable,  speaking  on  precisely  that  which  cannot  be  sensed  or
experienced. This is indeed what is at the heart of Kant's critique and which ties into the ethical
problematic of the other. It is an investigation into the “thing-in-itself by a detour of the scrutiny
of subjectivity. It was for this objective and nothing else that Kant elaborated the transcendental
structure of subjectivity” (Karatani 2005: 34). To speak of space, for Kant, is to 'feel out' the
extent  of  our  own  subjective  and  material  bodies.  In  other  words,  space  is  a  material
circumstance of existence defined by us both being embedded,  material  bodies  and subjects
actively animating our existence as bodies. To consider both ends of this dynamic is to fully
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determine, for Kant, what it “means to be bodily in a place” (Casey 1998: 241).
* * *
What are the consequences that this Kantian transcendental structure of subjectivity has
on the conception of space and place? In my Sisyphean quest to reach a theory of place, what we
have so far concluded is that place is the appearance of spatial difference as it is represented to us
as subjective bodies. Kant insisted that place is wholly indistinguishable from the living body: to
be bodily is always to represent and animate place. Space is the transcendental object to which
these representations of places necessarily relate, those within which our subjective bodies are
embedded. Space is as such an unknowable and anterior occurrence—not a representable object
per se but an a priori concept. 
It is also important to note that, through my investigation of Kant, place has ceased to be
a thing in the universe.  Place is no longer the innermost motionless boundary of a body but
instead  space qua difference. Place is the representation of space under particular circumstances
—that is, place is a representation that arrives precisely because we are different living human
bodies relating to each other and other bodies. There is hence no place-in-itself; there is only
space-in-itself, and space-in-itself is something which never actually appears to us as such. The
confusion emerges when we see place and attribute to it, as Aristotle had, the qualities of space-
in-itself. We appeal to a cosmological arrangement, to places as ingrained within the metaphysics
of  the  universe.  The  confusion  lingers  when  we claim to  know space-in-itself  by virtue  of
communicating  different  places,  as  if  we  can  triangulate  backwards  to  absolute  space.  I
investigated Kant to specifically highlight the limitations of human reason as never going beyond
representation,  and  hence  to  portray  the  theory  of  place  as  still  necessarily  transparent  yet
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aporetic: it appeals, always, to something beyond what is known—the thing-in-itself. As I shall
show next,  Martin  Heidegger  strove to  collapse this  transparency and thus  the gap between
metaphysical structure and its differentiated, representative appearances. He too, however, would
fall short of this task.
Heidegger on Dwelling-in-Place
Whereas Kant makes inextricable body and place, Heidegger approaches the problem of
place through a different route. As Casey describes:
Heidegger's way back to place is a middle way, a  via media  between body and mind,  
both of which are set aside in order to concentrate on what happens  between  them. In  
exploring this  open between—this between of the Open—Heidegger was drawn into  
detours that, despite their digressive character, allowed him to glimpse aspects of place 
overlooked by other thinkers, ancient as well as modern (Casey 1998: 243-244).
Heidegger's understanding of space, place, and region vary vastly throughout his lifetime, and so
what will only be said here is what Heidegger writes late into his life, around and after the time
of the publication of his writing “Building Dwelling Thinking” (1951). With this in mind, what
happens in between body and place for Heidegger at this point in his life? Dwelling. It is not so
much that Kant is here contradicted but rather complicated: bodies are indeed inextricable from
place, but it does not follow that the scope of place is then reduced to that of the body. The
simplification of place and that of the human condition as a living body does a disservice in
understanding that which makes us human but which extends beyond both our subjective mind
and our objective embodiment.  This is what Heidegger refers to as dwelling: the process of
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living in time and place and, as it is though never directly stated, in difference.
In “Building Dwelling Thinking,” rather than place being closed or limited, Heidegger
importantly draws out that, conversely, place is always already within the “space” of that which
is cleared. Heidegger writes: “I am never here only, as this encapsulated body; rather, I am there,
that is, I already pervade the room, and only thus can I go through it” (1971: 155). To think of
place as simply boundary does not fully recognize the total process and possibility of place-
making. The Open for Heidegger represents the possibility of place; it is only, in other words,
because the Open preexists that any place is possible. Moreover, Heidegger contends that place
“cannot be such a container” as per Aristotle “since the primary effect of place is to create room
and not to enclose or delimit it. In so doing, place brings about the openness of the Open” (Casey
1998: 280). Hence, in living in place, there is not fundamentally any condition of boundedness
but the exact opposite; there is always a process of clearing, of making space:
Spaces open up by the fact that they are let into the dwelling of man. To say that mortals 
are is to say that in dwelling they persist through spaces by virtue of their stay among 
things and locations...When I go toward the door of the lecture hall, I am already there, 
and I could not go to it at all if I were not such that I am there. The relationship between 
man and space is none other than dwelling,  strictly thought and spoken” (Heidegger  
1971: 157).
Heidegger insists here that, beyond the link between body and place is the whole relationship
between man and space in the total process of what he calls dwelling. This is not to say that
humans are not in addition bounded—or, rather, sheltered—with respect to their body or their
dwelling but instead that the process of living in place—for Heidegger part of the whole process
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of being human—is not be specified by 'being bound'. Rather, being in place is “being near”: 
the closeness, the intimacy, of things as they are gathered, and themselves actively gather,
in a particular place. To be in a place is to be near to whatever else is in that place, and 
preeminently  the  things  that  are  co-located  there.  Places  holding  things  are  in  turn  
assembled in regions, drawing night to each other in a protoaction of regionalized nearing
that achieves more than mere proximity. What more? In a word: dwelling (Casey 1998: 
281).
Dwelling for Heidegger  is  indicative of living in place by virtue of one's  closeness to other
things, by our nearness. This is, at least for later Heidegger, what it means to be human: “The
way in which you are and I am, the manner in which we humans  are  on the earth, is  Buan,
dwelling.  To  be  a  human  being  means  to  be  on  the  earth  as  a  mortal.  It  means  to  dwell”
(Heidegger  1971:  147).  Buan connects  dwelling  etymologically  to  “building,”  which  to
Heidegger is essentially what dwelling is. The term is deployed in two senses: first, through the
physical  building—of  communities,  cities,  and  roads—but  also  dwelling  “unfolds”  into  the
“building that cultivates growing things” (Heidegger 1971: 148). 
At the same time, though, dwelling is  also to preserve the fourfold of the earth,  sky,
mortals, and divine. The earth is the supporting ground. The sky is our spiritual referent—the
beyond. Mortals are us, the inevitability of our death as part of our essential nature, and the
divinities are the godhead, that by which we measure ourrsleves. Hence, for Heidegger:
Mortals dwell in that they receive the sky as sky...Mortals dwell in that they await the  
divinities as divinities...Mortals dwell in that they initiate their own nature—their being 
capable of death as death—into the use and practice of this capacity, so that there may be 
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a good death...dwelling occurs as the fourfold preservation of the fourfold (Heidegger  
1971: 150-151).
Dwelling in place is at once building and receiving; it is, truly, to let be. Place is then not a
matter  of  bounding  but  one  at  invited  by  the  openness  of  the  Open;  the  'making  room',
Gelassenheit,  that  permits  an  Open  and,  thereafter,  place.  Near  the  very  end  of  his  life,
Heidegger first asks the question: “Still, what is place?”  and responds, “Place always opens a
region in which it gathers the things into their belonging together” ([1969] 1973: 6). 
This is an important break between Heidegger and the works of Kant and Aristotle. Place,
for Heidegger, “gathers;” it is that-which-is-drawn-close and let to be—in sky, divine, mortal, or
nature—in the process of dwelling. As Casey explains, “Region or, rather 'that-which-regions'
(Gegnet) is that 'free expanse' (freie Weite) by means of which the Open lets things attain their
own rest...The things sheltered in the regional Open are tantamount to the places of that Open”
(Casey 1998: 283).  Everything can thus be considered a place: a sculpture, a house, a backyard,
even “empty space.”
By  specifying  place  and  dwelling  with  nearness,  Heidegger  accomplishes  a  way  of
thinking about place that apparently does not resort to any troubling reference to its external
boundaries, to the comparable alienation of place via its self-externality, or as constituted by the
difference of other bodies. Indeed, Heidegger presents a way in which “the Open is not enclosed
from without;” rather, the Open and thus place are able to be defined in intimate relations to
themselves,  in  their  own  nearness  (Casey  1998:  282).  Thus,  for  Heidegger,  the  distinction
between  metaphysics  and  the  individual  dwelling  collapses  at  a  point  of  self-referential
“dwelling.”  No  longer  should  there  be  anxiety,  so  it  seems,  over  the  thing-in-itself,  of  the
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parallax gap between the subjective and the objective, and, even more, of the aporia of place as
space  qua  difference.  Dwelling points place not toward a referent concept  out there,  beyond
representation, but always here, in our nearness.
For further clarification, consider Heidegger's negotiation of the difference between being
and Being through the concept of  Dasein,  or 'being there.'  Heidegger does this with specific
reference to Descartes and 'cogito ergo sum':
“If the 'cogito sum' is to serve as the point of departure for the existential analytic, we 
need  not  only  turn  it  around,  but  we  need  a  new  ontological  and  phenomenal  
confirmation of its content. Then the first statement is “sum,” in the sense of I-am-in-the-
world.  As such a being,  “I am” in the possibility of being toward various modes of  
behavior (cogitationes) as ways of being together with innerwordly beings. In contrast,  
Descartes  says  that  cogitationes  are  indeed  objectively  present  and  an  ego  is  also  
objectively present as a worldless cogitans.” ([1953] 1996: 195)
For Heidegger, the fact of 'I am' precedes our capacity to think: we first exist in the possibility of
Being, and this is specifically qualified as being in the world, or the 'thrownness' of Dasein. At
the  same time,  though,  we are  truly ways  of  Being first  and foremost,  and so,  as  Karatani
critiques,  Dasein is  “at  the  same  time  a  'Being-with [Mitsein]'”  (Karatani  2005:  97).  The
transcendental ego—to which the being of all egos 'connects'—is then nothing other than Being,
and Dasein and Mitsein always collapsed together within every possibility of sum.
But this  is  not all  that is at  stake in the confrontation of being.  The resolve between
ourselves  and  some  transcendental  concept—what's  more  for  Heidegger,  as  merely  an
ontological resolve—does nothing to address alarming 'horizontal' difference. That is, in other
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words, such an ontology cannot and in fact refuses to recognize singularity,  and, as a result,
difference is further obscured. As Karatani writes:
What is really commonly concealed in philosophy is not the difference between beings 
and Being, as Heidegger claimed, but the transcendental difference or the interstice—the 
very thing Heidegger himself ended up concealing by his political ontology. And so it is 
also that Heidegger interpreted the Kantian transcendental critique exclusively along its 
vertical  vector,  to  its  depth.  For  me,  by  contrast,  transcendental  critique  should  be  
considered  and practiced—at  the  same time—along  its  transversal  vector  (1Karatani  
2005: 98). 
To recognize singularity, one has to account for both the vertical and transversal vectors of the
transcendental structure of being. Otherwise, transcendental difference, as Karatani notes, only
ends up being concealed, as best exemplified in Heidegger's romanticized, “poetic” dwelling of
men. What I mean by this is to say that place may very well be specified by nearness, and this
may help resolve difference between being and Being by illuminating on its own terms the act of
dwelling,  but,  as a result,  nearness leaves out the capacity to understand  other places.  Place
cannot be recognized as such, as singularity,  but merely as the possibility of nearness. What
exists outside of a place belongs to Being, but only known in this sense and not as such. This is
where Kant specifically comes back to haunt us: nearness in place—to dwell by dwelling near—
is  only  meaningful  insofar  as  there  exists  that  unknown  which  is  far  away.  Hence,  the
problematic of the other still lingers, and the theory of place even in Heidegger continues to be
transparent, reliant on something outside of the ontology that Heidegger puts forth. Heidegger
can't  account  for  the  singularity  of  being,  much  less  the  singularity  of  place,  and  thus  he
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ultimately obscures the implicit doubt of his own concepts—Being, the Open—that Kant brings
to light by his critique of pure reason and the concept of representation. This turn, however, from
the body/place dynamic of Kant to the dwelling in place of Heidegger—and indeed, as shall later
be noted, the underlying political ontology—will become the pivotal change in the transparent
theory of place that will eventually spark bioregionalism, however indirectly. It is specifically in
the capacity to 'let be' through the process of dwelling in place that will grab the attention of
early bioregionalist  writing,  to  let  the  fourfold  preserve  the  fourfold,  or,  in  other  words,  to
ultimately let all things to rest.
Life-Place
Though Arne Næss predates the concept of bioregionalism, but he nevertheless alludes to
many of its tenets in his writing. The turn toward 'letting be,' for instance, first emerges in his
work “An Example of Place: Tvergastein,” in which he contemplates how “the idea of a home”
delimits “an ecological self, rich in internal relations to what is now called environment” (2010:
45). The process of bringing back place first requires the ego to give up the position of leader, as
controller over surroundings, environment, and place, and allow oneself to follow:
The main thing is that a favored place relentlessly and remorselessly determines the  
details of one's life. It may enrich life, but may also lead to a manifold of habits and ways 
of thinking that are peculiar and a source of irrtation to anybody not adapted to that  
special life. I find that attachment to places should not be praised uncritically 
(Næss 2010: 60).
It  is  important  to  note  that  this  is,  in  fact,  quite  similar  to  the  way of  living  in  place  that
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Heidegger had specifically mentioned in his late writing.  The process of living in place and
building an ecosophy as espoused by Næss is what was essentially for Heidegger the practice of
dwelling poetically, where “poetry” is defined by Heidegger as not truly of its own nature but a
special kind of referrent measure-taking.  Næss only flips the relationship so that man is not
measuring nature but nature sizes up man—to live poetically is to let nature determine you.
In  an  essay entitled  “...Poetically  Man Dwells...,”  Heidegger  makes  refers  back  to  a
section of a poem by Hölderlin (1984):
May, if life is sheer toil, a man
Lift his eyes and say: so
I too wish to be? Yes. As long as Kindness,
The Pure, still stays with his heart, man
Not unhappily measures himself
Against the godhead. Is God unknown?
Is he manifest like the sky? I'd sooner
Believe the latter. It's the measure of man.
Full of merit, yet poetically, man
Dwells on this earth. But no purer
Is the shade of the starry night,
If I might put it so, than
Man, who's called an image of the godhead (249-250)
The  process  of  dwelling  poetically  for  Heidegger  is  hence  the  capacity  to  measure  oneself
against the godhead—a god that is “unknown, and he is the measure nonetheless. Not only this,
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but the god who remains unknown, must by showing himself as the one he is, appear as the one
who remains unknown. God's manifestness—not only himself—is mysterious” (Heidegger 1971:
222). To dwell poetically is to live in recognition of the unknown, to submit oneself to the 'abyss'
of thrownness. To measure oneself against the godhead, one must carry on the impossible task of
taking in “the whole dimension in one” and making poetry with the universe (Heidegger 1971:
224). 
For  Næss, again in reverse, measuring oneself against the godhead is identified as the
process of self-realization, by which one comes to terms with the whole ecological self—that is,
the total Self transcending the individual ego—which can only be accomplished by first living in
the determination of place. Whereas self-realization starts out as the singular ego, this 'reality'
eventually falls to the transcendental ego of the ecological self by committing to a 'reinhabition'
of a particular place. Measuring oneself against the godhead is thus here equated as the ultimate
maturity of the self;  it  is  the point when and where place enables the ego to  sublate to the
transcendental ecological subject—to recognize Being, in other words. 
In contradistinction to  Heidegger,  living in place for  Næss is  thus not  the process of
leading and actively measuring,  but that of the ego-subject  following.  The result  is,  for later
bioregionalists, a bioregion in which “local life” is apparently made to be “aware of itself in its
natural  setting”  (Ryan  2012:  82).  Place  is,  then,  for  the  ensuing  bioregionalists,  identified
directly as the subject of the ecological self, the ego being only a shallow reflection of 'true'
selfhood. The place of bioregionalism is, in other words, the subject of itself, it is, as the specific
term 'bioregion' attempts to make clear, “life-place” (Thayer 2003: 3). Aligned with Heidegger's
sense of place, a bioregion is then intrinsically local; it is a self-realization. As Dave Foreman
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(1987) wrote, “in reinhabiting a place, by dwelling in it, we become that place. We are of it. Our
most fundamental duty is self defense. We are the wilderness defending itself” (22).
After  Næss,  a  dramatic  explosion  of  literature  in  deep  ecology  and,  thereafter,
bioregionalism,  would  follow,  carrying  within  each  text  nearly  identical  concepts  of
'reinhabitation,' 'place,' and 'bioregion.'3 Mimicking Heidegger, who laments that we no longer
we  do  not  dwell  poetically  (228),  bioregionalists  quickly  became  woeful  of  modern  man's
present placelessness. As Gary Snyder wrote in an influential 1976 essay: 
“There are many people on the planet, now, who are not 'inhabitants.' Far from their home
villages;  removed  from  ancestral  territories;  moved  into  town  from  the  farm...Re-
inhabitory  refers  to  the  tiny  number  of  persons  who  come  out  of  the  industrial  
societies...and then start to turn back to the land, to place” (1987: 28). 
On a similar note, the landmark essay “Reinhabiting California”  by Berg and Dasmann (1978)
remarks that to reinhabit means “learning to live-in-place in an area that has been disrupted and
injured through past exploitation” (217). 
In nuancing our present placelessness, Aristotle comes back to haunt in the details: In the
introduction to a more recent collection of bioregional essays, entitled Bioregional Imagination,
the  authors  make  note  of  that  bioregionalism  is  the  direct  response  to  the  fact  that  we
“increasingly  inhabit  a  global  monoculture,  consuming  the  same  food,  the  same  movies...
thinking the same thoughts from Canberra to Kathmandu” (Lynch et al. 2012: 6). The All returns
—we are  placeless  because  there  is  no  difference,  no other  places  by which  we can  define
boundaries  of  place.  Even after  many of  the critiques  of  bioregionalism had set  in—that  of
3 SEE:::::
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lacking a  component  of“cultural  mediation” (Gatlin  247),  as “utopianism” (Pepper  2005),  as
“strikingly similar” to environmental determinism (Frenkel 1994: 294), and of the bioregion's
sheer impossibility (Wylie 2012: 314)—there is still today the hope that “bioregional narratives”
will help “'restore the imagination' of place, namely, to understand and to orient the evolutionary
dynamics connected to the life of place, involving an open and more inclusive reflection on
identity, history, and ecology” (Iovino 2012: 100).
But what,  exactly,  is a bioregion? What is bioregionalism? The 'imagination of place'
means little when attempting to point your finger to the earth and identify place. How, in other
words, do we come to “know” where we are in bioregionalism? To help define a bioregion, many
bioregionalists have found it “important to recognize the influence of scientific ecology on the
bioregional  movement,”  in  the  capacity  to  “learn  the  land”  (Taylor  2000:  51).  In  fact,
identification of bioregion is first and foremost through the scientific process. Bioregionalism,
Sale writes, is
a way of living and thinking which views the world in terms of the actual contours and 
life-forms of the Earth—measured by the distinct flora and fauna, the climate and soils, 
the topology and hydrology, and how all these work together: regions defined by nature, 
not by legislation (2001: 41)
Bioregionalism is in this sense dwelling by measure-taking, directly invoking Heidegger and
ignoring the humility of Næss to recognize the landscape as determining us. What bioregionalists
—even the poets like Snyder and Sale—practice is first and foremost confirmed by a positivist
science  of  the  earth.  For  early  bioregionalists  in  particular,  the  capacity  to  deploy  new
technologies as a way of translating supposed natural 'meanings' into ones that can be understood
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by humans is fundamental to the process of recognizing bioregions. Even in the relatively more
nuanced approach of Berg and Dasmann (1978), “the final boundaries” of a bioregion, though
“best  dsecribed  by  the  people  who  have  lived  within  it”  are  initially  delimited  through
“climatology, physiography, animal and plant geography, natural history and other descriptive
natural sciences” (218). This includes a whole host of scientific observations as they are read
through political and cultural lenses, such as the value of “biological diversity,” which comes to
the forefront in bioregional thought as a call for social and cultural diversity (Dobson 2007: 102-
103). Strikingly, this also includes Malthusian claims of a bioregion's “carrying capacity” and
“population dynamics,” and thenceforth an incessant and immutable return to the “population
problem.”4 
Still, there seems to be little so far that concretizes a bioregion, that could be thought of
as a universal, exemplified definition. Though there is still no consensus to this end, much effort
(Parsons 1985; Snyder 1993; Ryan 2012) has gone into likening the bioregion as, at least usually,
the clearly definable watershed. In apparent resolution of the problem of defining bioregion,
Ryan contends that the use of watersheds allow bioregions to become “spatially precise” while
attending to cultural, environmental, and local nuances:
Bioregional boundaries are both integral to our experiences of watershed bioregions and 
that  some  environmental  problems  are  best  addressed  from 'bottom to  top,'  that  is  
beginning  with  bioregional  places.  Moreover,  bioregional  boundaries  make  possible  
porous connections to other bioregions. The borders of watersheds in fact present the  
possibility of caring between bioregions. Caring here begins with the local and more,  
4 See Figure 5 in the Appendix.
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precisely, the bioregional before encompassing the transregional or global (Ryan 2012:  
98).
Either  way,  what  appears  to  remain  fundamental  in  the  distinction  of  bioregion  is  the
marginalization of the human subject in favor of 'recognizing' the 'natural contours' of the earth
as the making of places. This is read, or taken measure, either first through the sophisticated
technologies of  science,  which enable us  to  'see'  the Earth for what  it  really is,  beyond the
political realm; or, secondly,  through the life-long process of actually dwelling in that place.
Insofar as this has been complicated through  the added dimension of the subject—in the form of
consciousness  or  cultural  dynamics  which  mediate  and construct  a  bioregion (Dodge [1981]
2007)—there is nevertheless the earthly kernel of a “discovered” bioregion that always remains.
Since the early days of bioregionalism, however, there has been a spiritual revelation that
contests this scientific order:
The  biological-ecological  sciences  have  been  laying  out  (implicitly)  a  spiritual  
dimension. We must find our way to seeing the mineral cycles, the water cycles, air  
cycles, nutrient cycles, as sacramental—and we must incorporate that insight into our  
own personal spiritual quest and integrate it  with all  the wisdom teachings we have  
received  from  the  nearer  past...jeweled-net-interpenetration-ecological-systems-
emptiness-consciousness tells  us,  no self-realization without the Whole Self,  and the  
whole self is the whole thing (Snyder [1976] 1987: 28).
Hence,  though bioregionalism reinvigorates Heidegger and the concept  of dwelling in place,
there is  nevertheless a subtle  return to the pre-Kantian problematic of Aristotle—that is,  the
bioregion conforms to the  a priori  spatial arrangement of the cosmos, except that today it is
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identified by science. More will be said about this in the next chapter when I investigate so-
called  'new  cosmology,'  but  it  should  be  sufficient  to  say  now  that  the  positivist  trend  in
bioregionalism  impedes  any  confrontation  with  the  aporia  of  place.  This  is  because  the
placement  of  the  human  living  body  as  subject  is  completely  ignored  in  bioregionalism.
Obliviously,  bioregionalists  are  wholly  respondent  not  to  the  earth-in-itself  but  to
representations. Mapping models and spatial analysis  are not the Earth: they are at their most
fundamental an intercourse with the world. Positivism denies this process as intercourse, instead
reckoning that maps are models  of  the world—not  with  the world—and that their data is the
absolute  translation  of  the  information  intrinsic  to  the  Earth.  The  aporia  of  place  is  never
confronted precisely because bioregionalists think the earth-in-itself can be discovered through
hydrology and other earth sciences. From Kant, I must again here insist that the earth-in-itself
does  not  exist  like  the  map of  the  Ohio  River  exists,  and within  this  differential  is  human
convention,  metaphysics,  politics,  power,  culture,  and a  whole host  of other factors.  Though
bioregionalism prides  itself  in  having  leaped  past  obstacles  toward  ecological  harmony and
finding  the  antidote  to  humanity's  present  placelessness,  insofar  as  the  aporia  of  place  is
concerned, it details nothing more than what we have already witnessed.
In fact, it is this precise problem that Heidegger encountered when he attempted to make
sense of Being in light of the political representative system of Nazi Germany. As Karatani notes,
[For Heidegger]  truth had to  be disclosed (erschlissen)  directly by Being via  a  poet-
thinker—the führer. In such a context, Heidegger insisted that the national referendum 
Hitler  organized  should  not  be  an  election  to  choose  representatives—but  a  direct  
revelation (Erschlossenheit). But...this is another form of representation, and perhaps its 
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ultimate collapse: an imaginary and aesthetic synthesis of the split of the contradicting 
classes (Karatani 2005: 149).
In  the  bioregional  context,  the “führer”  is  first recognized  as  the  scientist,  but,  within  new
cosmology, and as shall be shown in the next chapter, strictly positivist science is abandoned in
favor of claiming reverence to the omnipotence of the Eternal spirit, Gaia, or Mother Earth. What
Karatani  makes  clear,  though,  is  that  these  are  ultimately  representations,  attempting  to
“synthesize”  difference  through  the  apparent  nexus  of  science  or  spirituality  but  inevitably
ending up in their own impossibility. 
Indeed,  in  the  specifically  political  context  of  struggle,  many  environmentalists  see
themselves and their struggle as 'beyond' class or any other distinction of difference; 'we' are part
of something 'bigger'—that is, saving the earth. Even former socialists like Bookchin left that
kind of Marxist critique behind in the rushed judgment that such narrow-mindedness left no
place for what were truly and always ecological concerns (see Bookchin 1982). The rise of so-
called 'biocentrism' in environmentalist movements—directly a result of bioregionalism and deep
ecology—specifically has given rise to a vain and self-inflicted misanthropy: “green thinkers
implicitly embrace the dominant 'we have seen the enemy, and it is us' view that traces most
environmental problems to the buying habits of consumers, the number of babies born, and the
characteristics of industrialization, as if there were no class or other divisions in society” (Foster
1993:11). 
For  all  of  their  vying  for  “socially-just  human  cultures”  (Aberley  1999:  13),
bioregionalists rarely stray far from this narrative, at least in the political sense. This is not to
specifically  blame them,  though:  what  other  conclusion  could  be  reached  after  the  massive
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failure of unions to reconcile class concerns with those of race and gender in the 1960s? How
could  any  conscientious  objector  to  the  system remain  in  single  file  as  labor  unions  were
increasingly bought, sold, and set to war against each other by the enemy?  Especially when
considering  the  scientific  research  fueling  bioregional  concerns  over  'carrying  capacity'  and
'overpopulation,' if we are not to first stop the destruction of the planet, there will be no humans
alive and able to treat each other so poorly.
It is in fact this specific disassociation with particular and directed 'class interests,'  in
favor of speaking for 'earth interests' or 'the interest of humanity,' to which the political struggle
for place has now reached. This was the estrangement of Bookchin from fellow Marxists, but it
was also the outpouring of culturalism in the far left and the pluralistic, identity politics as they
have become spatialized since the 1970s. As David Harvey writes:
As the cultural mass has dropped any strong association with proletarian movements and 
sought to avoid a directly subservient position to capitalist culture it has become more 
closely identified with a cultural politics of place. Hence the outpouring of books on  
precisely that topic over the past 20 years...and the rise of a whole set of supportive  
political activities within the cultural mass for place-bound cultural movements (Harvey 
1996: 325).
Politicking  for  place  pervades  not  simply  environmentalism  but  virtually  all  'new  social
movements.'  This  circumscribes  back-to-the-land  movements,  community bloc  organizations,
neighborhood associations, and even campaigns for municipal redistricting. Most recently, place-
over-class  mentality arose during Occupy Wall  Street,  in  which the movement was virtually
nothing but the project of taking place with no definitive or partial political standpoint. 
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For  Harvey,  the  conclusion  is  then  to  get  back  to  saying  things  that  are  not  simply
contingent. Rather, we must reinstate a Marxist critique that will allow us to see the logic of
capital that has been at work all along. Specifically, Harvey sets aim at envirionmentalists as so
unsophisticated  with  regard  to  the  spatial  configuration  of  capital,  so  ignorant  of  political
dynamics when attempting to theorize place, as to be not much more than complicit bourgeois
shills:
The best that ecologists...seem to be able to offer is either some return to an urbanization 
regulated by the metabolic constraints of a bioregional world as it supposedly existed in 
what  were  actually  pestiferous  and  polluted  medieval  or  ancient  times,  or  a  total  
dissolution of cities into decentralized communes or municipal entities in which, it is  
believed, proximity to some fictional quality called 'nature' will predispose us to lines of 
conscious (as opposed to enforced) action that will respect the qualities of the natural  
world around us...And far too much of what passes for ecologically sensitive in the fields 
of architecture, urban planning, and urban theory amounts  to  little  more  than  a  
concession to trendiness and to that bourgeois aesthetics that likes to enhance the urban 
with a bit of green, a dash of water, and a glimpse of sky (1996: 427-428).
Harvey's  claims  hold  much  weight  and  clear  a  lot  of  the  utopian  air  from  the  immediate
bioregional dreams. After all, capitalism is undeniably at work in place-based social movements,
and the aspiration of defining our lives by “natural” boundaries is quite impossible when the
capacity to define what is natural is deflected by way of representation. Harvey is indeed keen of
this limitation, and he adds a political economic understanding  here of the introduction and
processing of such representations by way of a Marxist critique.
Kendall 53
But  even in  this  critique,  place  is  hardly met  within  any radically  new sophisticated
framework.  Kant  still  lingers,  and  the  impossibility  of  'knowing'  place  follows  precisely
alongside its constant deployment as difference. Whereas Heidegger neglected to confront what
Karatani calls 'transversal difference,' Harvey here recognizes and reiterates difference, but not
in-itself—only as represented under structure: “A renewed capacity,” Harvey writes, “to reread
the  production  of  historical-geographical  difference  is  a  crucial  preliminary  step  towards
emancipating the possibilities for future place construction. And liberating places—materially,
symbolically,  and  metaphorically—is  an  inevitable  part  of  any  progressive  socio-ecological
politics”  (1996:  326).  Difference,  of  course,  is  not  resolved  simply  by  reinstating  it  within
Marxist geography, for it still coincides with a seriously restricting ethical problematic of the
other. Nothing that has been said, or could be said, exceeds representation. How do we  know
difference if not only by representation? So far, we can't. We are still stuck at the aporia of place
as constituted by the problematic of difference. 
The extent of the following chapter is an elucidation of this claim through a discussion of
the makings of an eco-village in East Price Hill, Cincinnati. I call this an historical geography
specifically 'practicing bioregionalism.'  By this I mean that those involved follow the above-
mentioned ethic of 'life-place' in the attempt to resolve the political problematic of difference.
They do this by following Heidegger in the process of dwelling poetically, of measuring oneself
against  the  godhead,  but  also  by  re-imagining  Aristotle  in  a  new,  intensely  knowable,
cosmological arrangement. In the process, they end up near what Hegel had once argued:
The universal and the unity of the principle of consciousness and of the object, and the 
necessity of objectivity, make their first appearance here...consciousness as consciousness
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of the universal, is alone consciousness of truth; but consciousness of individuality and 
action as individual, an originality which becomes a singularity of content or of form, is 
the untrue or bad. Wickedness and error thus are constituted by isolating thought and  
thereby bringing about a separation from the universal. Men usually consider, when they 
speak of thinking something, that is must be something particular, but this is quite a  
delusion  (Hegel 1995: 293-296).
As  shall  be  shown,  though,  the  true  'delusion'  is  that  we can  speak  of  the  universal  as  we
presently do, in lieu of the subject. An implicit commitment to such a delusion denies Enright
Ridge the capacity to live-in-place. Rather, the ecovillagers, complicit to the logic of capital,
nation,  and state,  do not  'liberate'  place but only live-as-if  they had. But  this  is  no personal
limitation of Enright Ridgers. This stasis, this 'running-in-place' that is living-as-if, marks the
limitations imposed by the aporia of place.
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III. The Politics of Place
Xenophobia & Solipsism
There  is  no  greater  source  of  pride  in  living  in  the  West  Side  of  Cincinnati  than
rootedness. Though the East Side also has a deep sense of history, there is not as dependent of a
sense of attachment to one's surroundings as there is on the West Side. With its white-collar
influence (Prues & Heffron 2003: 250), its steady influx of newcomers in gentrified areas like
Oakley,  East  End,  or  Mount  Adams  (see  Figure  2),  and its  consolidated,  quick  commercial
expansion in places like the Kenwood Towne Centre (Wakeland 2014) or Rookwood Commons
(Demeropolis  &  Monk  2011),  the  East  Side  has  always  been  at  odds  with  blue-collar
neighborhoods like Price Hill, Westwood, or Delhi.5 Through the confluence of less economic
attention  (see  Figure  2)  and  forced  immobility  as  a  result  of  less  education  and  wealth
opportunities (La Botz 2008),6 West Siders have taken great stride and strength in what they can
retain: history and place. They are those working-class people celebrated in common American
political parlance who have the kind of knowledge of who and where they are that is cultured
only by living in one place for an entire lifetime. Being a 3rd-, 4th-, or 5th- generation Price Hill
resident  is  an  immense  source  of  pride,  an  empowering  label  that  the  West  Sider's  family
weathered all of the moments of prosperity and collapse—personal, economic, or otherwise—
without having being forced into the role of a Great Depression refugee or been sent packing
during white flight.
Such a celebration has contributed to the political geography of Enright Ridge in two
ways: firstly, through xenophobia, and, in recourse, solipsism. The former will help explain the
5 For reference of Cincinnati neighborhoods, see Figure 1 in the Appendix.
6 La Botz (2008) cites 2000 U.S. Census Data.
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latter. Though the term “xenophobia” immediately carries politically derogatory connotations, I
mean the word here in the more philosophical sense of fear of the 'xenos,' what is foreign or
strange. As such, it is not simply the precursor to racism or whatever leads to crass stereotypes
but something more indicative of the human condition: 'xenophobia' here is fear of what lies
outside the subject in the Kantian sense, fear of the other, of the thing-in-itself, and so on. Taking
the lessons learned from the previous chapter, I argue here that fear of what lies outside is an
effect of the aporia of being and should be first here considered both in a temporal and a spatial
sense. 
The former fear of time is a fear that temporality is inescapable yet never present as such.
This has been a seemingly unshakable anxiety in the West at large. It is the stuff of poetry. To
emphasize this, the melancholic realization that there were 'nows' that cease to be—and that we
no  longer  know—can  be  no  better  exemplified  in  the  West  than  in  Sir  Thomas  Browne's
Hydriotaphia, Urn Burial. Upon the discovery of a burial ground of Roman remains in Norfolk
England in the 1600s, Browne wrote of the human condition as a perpetual, dreadful annihilation
—only to be spared, he would later write in The Garden of Cyrus, by the glory of God (CITE).
What is more critical for the present purpose, though, is the first  side of the diptych, where
humanity is first cast within the oblivion of time:
We whose generations are ordained in this setting part of time...are naturally constituted 
unto thoughts of the next world, and cannot excusably decline the consideration of that 
duration, which make thy pyramids pillars of snow, and all that's past a moment. There is 
no antidote against the opium of time, which temporarily considerith all things...But the 
iniquity of oblivion blindly scattereth her poppy, and deals of the memory of men without
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distinction to merit of perpetuity. Who can but pity the founders of the pyramids? (1907: 
138-139).
This is what I mean when I say 'xenophobia'—what is lamented here is the deep-seated anxiety
that time can only truly be comprehended as nothing but departure, as annihilation, and if time,
then,  offers  no  steadily  and  knowable  orientation,  to  where  can  the  subject  turn?  Hence,
xenophobia in this sense is a fear not of the outside but, more truly, of not knowing oneself by
way of that which lies outside, hence Browne is the poet-subject who weeps because of a lack of
understanding  of  the  other,  an  impossibility  of  knowing the  nature  of  the  difference  which
constitutes the self. My reading of temporal xenophobia is thus Kantian in the specific way that
was defended in the first chapter, as a kind of melancholic scrutiny of the embodied 'now,' which
is itself permanent exodus. Temporal xenophobia is Kantian, in other words, because time is
something which we are embodied by and are ourselves embodiments of—we are born; we age;
we die—and yet time is a concept that exists a priori to our representations of it; it is constantly
escaping.
Resisting xenophobically means to do one's best to keep static, to freeze the 'now' of yore
and uphold it by any means necessary—politically, technologically, socially, religiously, and so
on. Hence the nostalgia for that bygone era of pedestrianism in urban redevelopment projects
(“Urban Commercial Overlay Overview & Best Practices” 2009); or the desire for for some
future anti-industrial primitivism by way of championing the late 1800s Luddite rebellion against
industrialization  (Sale  1996);  or  through the  romanticization  of  tribal  peoples  in  bioregional
literature, those guardians of the “Old Ways” of living peacefully with the earth (Snyder [1976]
1987);  or  a  “new look” that  recovers  pagan beliefs  like  the  “Gaia” to  aid our  ailing planet
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(Lovelock 1979), or, on the contrary, the redemption of a battered Christian “anthropocentric”
metaphysics  and  the  illumination  of  its  original  “theocentric”  intent  (Simkins  2014).  All
instances above are efforts to convince ourselves that we haven't  really  changed, that we have
only been so far confused about what we always have been.
Whatever the path taken, all tend to deny the 'present' as truly our rightful home: the age
of industrialization was the process of alienation that post-industrial societies is able to both
recognize and lament in parallax. Bioregionalism rests at the crux between what we as humans
used to  be which contributes  likewise toward a  fear  of  where we are going in  every sense:
technologically, economically, ecologically, ethnically, in gender roles,  any change is one that
forces us to lose ground. On the surface, then, it is a failure to orient oneself that compels the
response of bioregionalism. But, in the more Kantian sense, what truly moves is the dread of not
understanding difference, for everything, even ourselves, always feels different.
For new cosmology and bioregionalism, fear of what lies beyond in the spatial dimension
may seems to feel a little more resolvable in the politics of place. Rather than divulge, though,
into  an  exhausting  critique  and  confrontation  of  the  metaphysics  of  place,  rather  than  risk
speaking  beyond  what  can  possibly  be  spoken,  place-based  political  life  has  more  readily
attempted to just 'stay put,' to avert one's gaze from the aporia of place and contribute full force
to a more confident labyrinth, like the theology of the Earth. 
But in doing so, they arrive specifically at the political strategy of solipsism. Here, I must
first specifically define what I mean. As Karatani makes clear, solipsism is “not the idea that only
I exist, but that what is true of and for me is common to everyone. This apparently innocuous but
in fact draconian move functions as a tacit politics of internalizing the other” (2005: 73). The
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'history'  that  'brings  back'  the  bygone  peace  which  we  once  knew assumes  this  sense  of  a
common history, eliding difference for the purpose of a comfortable narrative. Bioregionalism, I
claim, is a solipsism that 'really' knows. Hence, the turn to solipsism is provoked by xenophobia
in both the temporal and—as shall now be considered—the spatial sense.
Unlike the temporal condition that at minimum demands all humans traverse time and
subsequently undergo change, it is completely within one's own power, or at least it appears, to
simply not move. Living in the legacy of one's ancestors, in the very historical place of one's own
genealogy, a comforting sense of oneself is established in the West Side of Cincinnati by staying
put, particularly in spite of an industrial world that feels ever-increasingly flattened, placeless,
and alienated. “Self-realization” and “reinhabitation,” following the respective advice of Næss
(1973) and Berg and Dasmann (1978) but politically practiced long before either ever set pen to
paper, has come by way of rootedness, by living in place for generations. The emergent sense of
self  in  the  West  Side  of  Cincinnati,  a  sense  that  precedes  Enright  Ridge  by generations,  is
conditioned by this loyalty to place—a notion, as one should recall, that has so far only meant in
the distinctly political  sense a  practice of  difference and one that  lacks a  broad,  penetrative
confrontation with the aporia of place. 
Xenophobia is not just fear of the unknown but fear of the  encroaching  unknown, fear
that one's sense of self via the political constitution of difference is slowly slipping away. Hence,
what is important is that, predating any ecovillage aspirations, there is a feeling of rootedness in
East Price Hill that is essentially nothing more than the political geography of difference at work,
where xenophobia is resolved not by its dissolution or the poetic embracing of its inner anxiety
but by its direct spatial confirmation and deployment. Bioregionalism is solipsistic in the sense
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that it assumes the universality of difference and actively seeks to mediate it by staying in place
and encouraging others to do so as well. The xenophobia that gives way to solipsism is hence
experienced superficially as conservatism: being still, retaining the status quo. The subsequent
synthesis of ecological practices did not contest this geography of difference but instead were
directly enabled by it.
Contrary  to  much  of  the  sympathetic  literature  on  intentional  communities  and
bioregional practice, this chapter seeks to explain how xenophobia and solipsism, by way of
rootedness and conservatism, are the political grounds for the substantiation of Enright Ridge. I
contend  that  these  conditions  illuminate  the  structural  understanding  of  place.  What  I  am
attempting to highlight is the debilitating dissonance between place in idea and place in practice.
What was thought to be place existing in peaceful ecological harmony, of dwellers measured
against the All, against the godhead, becomes, in practice, the subjection and compliance of all to
an  immense,  geographically  settled  matrix  of  power.  Moreover,  this  dissonance  denies  the
sovereignty of the ecovillagers to live-in-place and condemns them always to living-as-if. The
politics of place are then constitutive of a gap in the transition from thought to praxis that leads
those with good intentions to do bad things. This is indicative of the aporia of place; it is also
indicative of  power.  Thus,  the place in  which  the ecovillagers  dwell  is  always  political  and
inspired by difference (xenophobia) and 'Truth' (solipsism), compelling them to practice place in
a way that resists as it simultaneously sustains power. Hence I do not claim that community
members at Enright Ridge (or even the founders) are anything close to hard-line conservatives.
By no means are they any more or less racist or exclusionary than others. What I am saying is
that the politics of place in practice are limiting irrespective of personal or social convictions;
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'good'  people are still  forced in 'place'  to be agents in the better  facilitation of biopower,  of
capital, of asymmetrical and undignified socio-natural relations in general. Even if everyone at
Enright Ridge were vocally and adamantly race- and gender-conscious eco-anarchists, a properly
accommodating practice to such a critique of the system is beyond the possibility of the present
politics or metaphysics of place. These are, in fact, the two sides of the aporia of place. Thus,
they live-as-if not because they desire that kind of imaginary, static living, but because, if the
desire for them is to live in practice for a better world, living-as-if is truly all that exists. Any
sovereign anarchistic  'place'7 would have to answer the aporia  of place which is,  at  present,
unanswerable. 
Negotiating Difference in New Cosmology
Enright Ridge began “as a compromise,” its founder Jim Schenk writes, between him and
his wife Eileen (2005:1). Native to a small rural Indiana town and desiring of an ecologically
harmonious  lifestyle,  Jim did  not  initially  feel  at  home  in  such  a  congested  urban  area  as
Cincinnati; but his wife, a woman with a family tree that extended several generations into the
historical  geography  of  Price  Hill,  insisted  on  staying  put.  Eileen  convinced  Jim  with  a
compelling  argument:  “She  pointed  out  an  urban  environment  offered  the  best  chance  for
creating a village like community because of the numbers of people there with their proximity to
each other,  public  transportation and options for employment” (Schenk 2005:1).  Contrary to
convention, it appeared that an urban, highly concentrated population directly embedded within
7 “Place” at this point should be so riddled with confusion as to be rather useless in considering what might come 
after the aporia of place is resolved. Hence, scare-quotes are used to reference that whatever comes next will be 
something like that which we call place, for lack of a better term, but is by no means restricted to our so far 
densely aporetic understanding of such a thing.
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the built environment of the city offered a prime location for promoting the kind of life Jim
desired. 
Moreover, and as all who have been involved with Enright Ridge would come to realize,
there is a critical importance in resisting the urge to “give up” on the city, to self-ostracize and
live outside on some rural commune until buried in the ground. There are still people in cities,
after all, and moat-building does nothing to address what are much more penetrating issues than
one's own happiness. Hence, as a reflection of both of the founders' education and experience in
social work, the prefacing of Enright Ridge as a specifically urban compromise highlights that
the  question of  what  is  socially just  cannot  be avoided when attempting to  address  what  is
environmentally just. Immediately in the agreement to live and grow roots in the city, the place
of  most  intense  social  difference  and  indignity,  there  is  the  acknowledgment  of  what  for
Bookchin would become the central tenet of addressing a specifically  social ecology, namely,
that “the very notion of the domination of nature by man stems from the very real domination of
human by human” (1982:65). 
The willingness to marginalize one's own impact by avoiding this reality combined with
the white, middle-class privilege inherent to rural intentional communities are means that end up
sustaining the unjust conditions of both social and environmental hazards. “It is almost as if,”
David  Harvey  writes,  “a  fetishistic  conception  of  'nature'  as  something  to  be  valued  and
worshiped separate from human action blinds a whole political movement to the qualities of the
actual living environments in which the majority of humanity will soon live” (1996:427). No,
the city must not be avoided. The city is an ecosystem itself, after all—one that is wrought from
humans whom are natural beings. At the outset, then, the founders of Enright Ridge did not make
Kendall 63
the geographical mistake of marginalizing themselves to the periphery of the most apparent,
daily, and direct ecological problems: pollution, consumption, and so on. Instead, ecology in East
Price  Hill  was  always  intentionally  urban  and  social,  and  there  was  indeed  much  careful
consideration of specifically social problems even before the founders moved to Enright Avenue.
To  this  end,  Jim  initially  felt  little  resolution  to  questions  of  the  human  condition,
questions that no devout Catholic upbringing or priesthood aspirations seemed to mend. This was
a lingering anxiety that indeed swept much of the United States in the wake of the civil rights
movement, the Vietnam War, and the 1973 oil crisis. What should not be forgotten, though, is
that this epoch was not simply a reaction of corruption, injustice, and inequality from liberals but
concurrently the kind of xenophobia that has been previously outlined. Anxiety in America was
felt everywhere: on the left there were new social movements,  Silent Spring, 'back-to-the-land'
movements; there were direct action movements like GreenPeace, the Animal Liberation Front,
and Earth First!, but on the far right there was Ruff's  Famine and Survival in America and the
former American Nazi Kurt Saxon's tabloid monthly The Survivor. Indeed, it should be said that
both paths are fundamentally xenophobic: whereas Silent Spring is literally a fear of the things
we do not know that are currently happening and shaping our socio-natural reality and, hence,
brings to doubt the self-understanding of our position as 'free' political subjects, identity politics
boldly brought to center those marginal people that “we” had always used to define ourselves by
virtue of their othered position, therefore leading to a crisis of not knowing how to thereafter
orient  onself.  Ruff's  fear  in  Famine and Survival  in  America,  after  all,  was  not  simply the
consequences  of  rampant  inflation  but  the  totality  of  socio-economic  collapse  that  would
necessary follow from abandoning economic, social, and “Eternal” laws: 
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There can be no stability in a nation that forgets that the basic unit of society is the home, 
and when a significant portion of our people either lose faith in it, or violate and reject the
Eternal Laws that secure the family and hold it together, then a society comes apart as its 
smallest  unit  disintegrates.  We will  learn  this  the  hard  way as  only the  tightly  knit  
families that are emotionally, physically and spiritually prepared will survive in good  
condition.
You can't indefinitely violate economic laws without weakening an economic structure. 
You  can't  penalize  producers  and  sources  of  capital  by  confiscatory  taxation,  and  
crippling,  expensive,  unnecessary  regulation,  without  eventually  destroying  any free  
economic system (1978: 73).
Hence, what is truly alarming for Ruff is the encroaching unknowns of state power and family
dissolution by way of abortion, straying from God, and so on. The encroaching unknown is also,
it should be made clear, not just some abstract feeling: Arab oil nations quite literally affected the
behavior and lifestyle of car-driving Americans in 1973 by forcing a shortage that gave way to
long lines at the pump and daily restrictions of gas purchase depending on license plate number.
What  appeared  on the  left  was the  same sort  of  anxiety but  one that  was attempted  to  be
resolved  through  more  inclusive  and  conscious  representations  of  the  other.  The  first
“realization” of the margin, so to speak—before the setting-in of post-structural critique—was
one that not only contested common sense understandings of other people, in doing so, contested
the total history and place of one's identity. Both sides, then, reflected the historical and place-
specific social process of American life in the 1970s, and any subsequent reaction at any position
on the political spectrum must be read as a response to the unhappiness Jim Schenk felt as he
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studied in seminary school. 
What distinguishes Jim, though, is that his unhappiness led neither to anarchist disavowal
nor  toward  digging  in  and  holding  firmly  to  the  'laws'  of  economy and  family;  rather,  his
unhappiness  turned first  into a  disillusionment  with  Christianity.  The feeling  of  unhappiness
became so concerning in Jim's life that he would eventually walk out of seminary school after
nearly a decade and pursue a career in social  work. This was a much needed broadening of
perspective,  and  direct  and  immediate  action  undoubtedly  relieved  some  unhappiness,  but
pressing  questions  and  anxiety  still  persisted,  particularly  those  that  escaped  the  scope  and
gravity of on-the-ground interpersonal contact. As Jim Schenk explains,
During  my years  as  a  social  worker,  a  question  kept  coming  to  me:  'Why,  in  the  
wealthiest nation in the world, are there still so many poor people?' And as I spent time 
with VISTA volunteers, fellow students, staff members and volunteers, and even with  
friends, I became keenly aware of a pervasive sadness and discontent that seemed to  
burden the lives of so many people...I began to ask the question 'Why?' and wondered 
about a possible connection regarding the commonality of dissatisfaction in the ranks of 
both the poor and the wealthy (2006:15-16).
Indeed, the closer and deeper one looks at the problem, the more difficult any answer becomes.
This is especially if someone takes such a question to be deeply philosophical and spiritual. The
furthest extent of practical church wisdom seemingly mirrored, after all, the literature of right-
wing survivalism that was to begin emerging at this time. Take, for instance, the possible answers
to suffering within Christianity: the first, that of eventual redemption in the afterlife, nevertheless
leaves open the questions of what is moral and just on this earth.  Moreover, if suffering is part of
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the path toward salvation, why must some suffer such magnitudes more than others? The second
answer, the oikonomos, that of equilibrium and the eternal necessity of pain as a counterpart to
joy, but inequality doesn't seem to square well with this sense of economy. The third response,
that of temptation and punishment, has always been a hard claim to hold when such seemingly
innocent people suffer such miserable fates. It is hard to sit comfortably, for instance, with the
judgment that what was most just in a tsunami was for such a broad sweep of deaths to occur.  Of
course,  what  is  generally  the  response  to  such  auxiliary  questions  is  that  their  answers  are
unknowable and what is required of the faithful is salto mortale, that 'fatal leap' that can only be
understood,  à la  Kierkegaard, as the decision of 'faith.' The question of economic disparity, of
class difference,  therefore remains unsettled within the responses of the church and no more
conquered in mere daily action and private conversation. At the same time, all possible paths
represent  a  kind  of  conscientious  removal—as  is  the  declared  intent  of  survivalists  and
communes—from the lived reality of so many living things suffering. Beyond the geographical
mistake  of  self-marginalization,  then,  from  the  outset  Jim  Schenk  also  refused  to  live  for
anything other than this world. 
Thus,  the  entirety  of  What  Does  God  Look  Like  in  an  Expanding  Universe?,  the
collection  of  deep  ecological  and  new  cosmological  essays  which  Jim  Schenk  edited  and
published in 2006, is about 'correcting' the real-world effects of Western Christian metaphysics.
From the thoughts of Plato,  Aristotle, Augustine,  and Aquinas,  Schenk argues, this particular
problematic  of  man's  separation  from  nature,  and,  moreover,  the  recognition  of  an  eternal
anthropocentric spirit,  was embedded into Christian cosmology, and, following the reasoning
above, “one of the consequences of this belief was the devaluing of the Earth and a desire to
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dominate and control it. It is difficult to honor the planet or to consider respecting or preserving
it as important when the afterlife is what matters; everything else is just buying time” (2006:28).
The  problem hence  remained  deeply spiritual  for  Jim but  escaped the  purview of  Christian
dogma. It was not in the politics, the teleological orientation, or the religious form of the church
that  difference could be meaningfully answered.  Rather,  these seemed to be the problematic
effects of something more deeply penetrating, for, though not necessarily Christian, the question
remained altogether “cosmological,” or, as Jim writes, a question of “understanding our place in
the universe” (2006:18). To understand disparaging political and economic difference was to find
anew that transcendental arrangement of people, place, and universe that had apparently always
been. As Thomas Berry,  a major influence on Jim Schenk, writes, what is attempting to be
brought about spiritually is an “Ecological Age,” one that 
takes us back to certain basic aspects of the universe which have been evident to the  
human mind from its earliest period but which have been further refined, observed, and 
scientifically stated in more recent centuries. These governing principles of the universe 
have controlled the entire evolutionary process from the moment of its explosive origin 
some fourteen billion years ago, to the shaping of the earth, the emergence of life, of  
consciousness...These principles that have been known in all past ages by immediate  
intuitive processes are now understood by scientific reasoning although their implications
have not yet been acted upon in any effective way. The new age, however, the Ecological 
Age, must not only understand but activate these principles in a universal context if the 
human venture is to continue. These principles on which the universe functions are three: 
differentiation, subjectivity and communion (12-13).
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Hence something like biodiversity, the science of which is so highly regarded in bioregionalism,
comes  alive  in  Berry  as  the  magnificence  of  the  union  of  differentiation,  subjectivity,  and
communion, as readily identified by modern institutional science. The call for a response to such
forces  in  the  “unfolding  of  the  earth  process”  is,  after  all,  the  “ultimate  lesson  of  Physics,
Biology, and all the sciences, as it is the ultimate wisdom of the Shamanic personality of tribal
peoples, and the fundamental teaching of the great civilizations” (Berry 19). This differentiation
in turn gives way to the subject, the “psychic being” that exists down to every individuated atom
(Berry 13), and, finally, the point in understanding the first two cosmological functions is to bow
one's head toward the last: communion, the whole of difference that constitutes manifold reality.
The human spirit or subject is not so much reduced here from being human as it is expanded to
the whole of the universe. The rather restrictive statement of “we are natural” becomes for the
ecovillagers,  “We  are  nature.”  This  was  the  response  from  over  half  of  the  ecovillagers
interviewed in a study of Ohio Valley ecovillages by Wight: “The members of these ecologically
oriented communities do not perceive a difference between the human (cultural) and the natural;
in their view, we are all made from the same (spiritual and physical) elements that exist as part of
the larger whole” (2008: 35). Sublation of the problem of difference, which at one and the same
time is the problem of being a subject, is attempted in the process of making everything the one
eternal Subject. 
This is nothing more than the Christian version of the deep ecology of Næss and his
concept of self-realization, where the path from establishing difference to metaphysical, holistic
self  is  by  way of  seeing  “'ourselves  in  others.'  Our  self-realization  is  hindered  if  the  self-
realization of others, with whom we identify, is hindered” (Næss 2010:82). Hence, the subject
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first comes to terms with ego and adapts to an ecological self by way of orienting oneself in
difference.  The act of living for Næss,  the process of reinhabiting place—being ecologically
bounded by a mountain hut in Norway—immediately assumes and indeed is substantiated by its
difference from other places and the “place-corrosive process” of modernity (Næss 2010:45).
Recall again, as Snyder wrote, there is “no self-realization without the Whole Self,” and hence
what is apparently truly at peril is not our own place or self specifically but the whole of the
earth subject to which we as individual subjects are organically and spiritually embedded ([1976]
1987:28). The concept of personal salvation, in other words, is only made meaningful by virtue
of  its  acknowledged  and  protected  embeddedness  within  a  much  broader  and  universal
cosmology. 
 Xenophobia—which I mean here, as one should recall from earlier, most directly as fear
of not knowing oneself by way of difference—is confronted here, but the dreadful, encroaching
unknown is seen primarily as an erroneous understanding of the human subject. Striking down
Descartes, what we need to grow into is an understanding of self or subject past that of cogito. As
Næss writes: “We underestimate ourselves. And I emphasize selves. We tend to confuse our 'self'
with the narrow ego” (Næss 2010:81).  We do not  realize ourselves,  in  other  words,  but  we
ourselves are realized only through the whole self—the godhead, Gaia, the universe, or whatever
label seems most appropriate. The entire push of all deep ecology, from Næss to Berry, is to
insist  that  the  deeply  spiritual  problematic  of  man's  domination  of  nature  fails  at  its  initial
premise; what is actually true in the most metaphysical sense is that we live embedded and in
communion with an intrinsically valuable whole. Domination over nature is a kind of illusion
exacerbated by differences that are purely political and by no means 'true.' Thus, in the ideology
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that would go on to form the basis of all that has been done on Enright Avenue, the question of
difference is  resolved in the specific  undoing of the political  and exaltation of cosmological
difference.  Enright  Ridge thus  reflects  the spatio-spiritual  practice of  deep ecology.  It  is  the
willingness to live rooted in place, irrespective of political difference aligned with the communal
differences of a vast, sentient, ordered universe—the one eternal Subject.
The problem,  of  course,  is  as  it  has  always  been in  making such a  cosmological  or
dogmatic claim: who gets to determine what constitutes this one eternal Subject and with what
mandate?  First,  the  'who'  is  us—but not  just  any 'us;'  instead it  is  those who are in  such a
political, economic, and social condition as to be able to initially embrace and “realize” this all-
encompassing,  eternal  Spirit.  The  'we'  are  those  who  have  the  splendid  opportunity  to  live
simply, to be an ecovillager, and to unearth the hidden secrets of long-forgotten pagan rituals.
Thus, in the attempt to resolve the problem of difference by transcending the human subject, we
end up precisely where we began: in the unfortunate confrontation with the specifically human
limits  to  our  subjective  understanding  of  that  which  lies  beyond.  At  no  moment  in  deep
ecological thought is there any going beyond representation into something more transcendent.
The entirety of deep ecology, bioregionalism, and environmentalism at large is not in discovering
the truth of the universe but merely in determining 'better' ways to 'speak for' it.
By spiritually binding oneself to the whole and not merely different beings, otherness
falls away: everything becomes merely an extension of ourselves. This is not a case of “speaking
for” anyone or anything but direct revelation of Truth and Self of which our personal ego is only
at  best  marginal.  New cosmology is  in  this  sense  nothing  more  than  a  new dogma,  where
'ritualists' become prophets not of an Abrahamic God but of the Holy Truth of Nature. Hence,
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when Abram suggests at the Second North American Bioregional Conference in 1986 to include
non-human representatives  at  the next  congress  in  order  to make sure their  “voices” can be
heard, this is not seen as a seriously problematic projection of human thoughts onto animals but
rather as the next logical step in better verifying the consensual Truth of the one Eternal spirit
(Taylor 2000:57). Recall the Wittgenstein adage: “If a lion could talk, we could not understand
him” (Wittgenstein [1953] 2009 :223). Not only do the new cosmologists insist that the lion is
talking  but,  indeed,  that  we  can  understand  him.   What  better  way,  in  other  words,  to
communicate with the other sentients of this world than bringing to NABC III the “Council of
All Beings” and performing the prescribed rituals that allow us and animals alike to meet in deep
ethereal connection (Taylor 2000:57)?
To  the  frustration  of  all  those  at  the  NABC  II,  though,  the  conscious  denial  of
anthropocentrism does nothing but further confirm it. This is because anthropocentrism, however
unfortunately, is an inescapable limitation of our capacity to know. Certainly, there remains the
capacity to self-marginalize, to recognize ourselves as embedded in something far more whole,
but insofar as we claim speech of this whole, we are acting only in human representation—the
whole as it appears to us. Hence, it is not so much that the subject becomes 'beyond human' in
such a mystified process as including animals at the round table but rather the exact opposite: by
virtue of such 'rituals,'  we now claim subjective authority over  how non-human animals  are
thinking in ways that were before left completely unknown. It is unavoidable that all things of
necessity pass through representation by this newly ecologically-conscious human subject, for, if
we are truly honest with ourselves, it is always us writing the statements. The lion only 'speaks'
to us, for instance, precisely because we have represented it as a thing that speaks. To claim
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something beyond this is to claim a knowledge beyond representation. As a result, the attempt to
remove an anthropocentric or empirical cosmology—e.g. science—does the opposite: nature, in
effect,  becomes even more human by virtue of us claiming access to  the deeply ontological
knowledge that lies beyond. This anthropomorphization of nature is heard, for instance, in the
environmentalist motto of “Save the Earth!,” forgetting that the earth as such is not even what is
known to us; all we merely have are but representations of it.  In this sense, new cosmology
merely  reiterates  the  “fundamental  event  of  the  modern  age”  Heidegger  described  as  “the
conquest of the world as picture” (1977: 134).
In the initial new cosmological invocation brought to bear on Enright Avenue, there are
immediate  political  consequences  that  can  be  brought  to  light  with  reference  to  the  Prison
Notebooks. While remarking on religion, Gramsci makes a note addressing what he describes as
the “fetish” of the collective organism:
A collective organism is comprised of single individuals who form the organism in so far 
as they are given and actively accept a hierarchy and a particular leadership. If each one 
of the single members considers the collective organism to be a body extraneous to  
themselves, it is obvious that this organism no longer exists in reality but becomes a  
phantom of the intellect, a fetish...Individuals expect the organism to act, even if they do 
nothing and do not reflect that, since their attitude is widespread, the organism is of  
necessity  inoperative...single  individuals  (seeing  that,  despite  their  non-intervention,  
something nonetheless happens) are led to think that in actual fact there exists above them
a phantom entity, the abstraction of the collective organism, a species of autonomous  
divinity that thinks, not with the head of a specific being, yet nevertheless thinks, that  
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moves, not with the real legs of a person, yet still moves, and so on  (1999:  124-125,  
Q15§13). 
The  introduction  of  a  new  collective  organism  in  the  form  of  a  transcendental  spirit  is
characteristic of the matrix of power by which people have long since been relating to each other.
In the wake of all of the social and economic change occurring in the 1970s, in the lament of
what  appeared  to  be  nothing  but  disorientation,  xenophobia  led  to  the  emergence  of  new
cosmology, deep ecology, and bioregionalism as various flavors of some atavastic metanarrative
that predated industrialization, Christianity, or even the human condition. Thus, it was the search
for  a  beyond  or  supra-human  subject—'moving  like  a  human,  thinking  like  a  human'—
organizing and valorizing the universe. 
Politically speaking, the fetish of the collective organism forms the necessary basis of
power; it is the initial grounding of the hegemony apparatus. This is an often-confused term that
requires further clarity. The non-Gramscian sense of 'cultural hegemony' as a kind of discursive
catchall  for  any  coercive  effect  on  anyone  anywhere  is  not  what  is  meant  in  the  Prison
Notebooks. Rather, what Gramsci is trying to explain through the concept of hegemony is moral
and intellectual leadership as a condition of the political.  In other words, the question which
hegemony  answers  is  how  does  leadership  come  to  be  and  why do  others  submit,  usually
willingly,  to this  leadership.  Hegemony was a way for Gramsci to  understand how dramatic
political, social, and economic difference, which seemingly should define different interests at
the  level  of  the  individual,  coagulate  into  one  and the  same political  reality.  The collective
organism is both spectral and objective; it is a fetish that is 'not real' but made real by virtue of its
embeddness in human thought and activity. As Gramsci writes, “The realisation of a hegemonic
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apparatus, in so far as it creates a new ideological terrain, determines a reform of consciousness
and of  methods of knowledge:  it  is  a  fact  of  knowledge,  a philosophical  fact”  (1999:  690).
Hegemony in Gramsci's sense is the process by which bourgeois values become the 'common
sense' values for the entire society.
Bringing Gramsci to bear on new cosmology, then, I conclude that new cosmology does
not 'break' hegemony but in fact further reifies relations of power in two fundamental ways. First,
through the direct reproduction of the so-called collective organism. In the effort  to identify
every  constituent  particle  of  the  universe  as  being  its  own subject,  and,  even  more,  in  the
assertion that all of these being one and the same subject, what is accomplished is nothing more
than the anthropomorphization of nature.  It is not that subjecthood is extended to nature but
rather that  our own  subjecthood now claims within its scope that of properly 'understanding'
nature, animals, and the Eternal spirit as a whole. There is no shift of “our consciousness from an
anthropocentric view to an Earth-centered view of life” as desired by Enright Ridge but instead
merely an anthropogenic image which claims to self-marginalize and represent the earth at center
(Reidel 2008:57).  Further,  the attempt to do away with the politics of difference, so rightly
lamented by Jim Schenk in his early life before arriving to Enright Avenue, leads again to their
further  cosmological  legitimation.  What  seems  to  be  forgotten  is  that  the  political  claim of
difference is always substantiated ontologically, and ontological claims of difference are indeed
always represented politically. To address either, one must address both, but to do this, one must
approach difference in general, or, more precisely, within the total prevailing metaphysics.
Secondly, and what will require further explanation in the coming sections, is that Enright
Ridge is itself an effect of power, as are its inhabitants. This was brought about as deep ecology
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and  new  cosmology—ideologies  that,  despite  their  lack  of  revolutionary  potential,  contest
hegemony—were attempted to be put into practice via bioregionalism. What can be identified in
the  geography  of  Enright  Ridge  however,  but  power  settled  geographically.  There  is  a
disconnect, in other words, between the ideology of bioregionalism—antagonistic to the politico-
economic  territorialization  of  Nation-State-Capital—and  to  what  eventually  comes  to  be
practiced as bioregionalism: namely, a self-marginalized community living not in-place but only
as-if.  Thus, beyond the initial clarification of Enright Ridge's reification of power by way of
“new cosmology,” this second characteristic of the ecovillage will allow me to say something
much more meaningful about the overall nature of power as it has settled within the geography
of Enright Avenue. 
Imago I: Seminary Square
In 1978, after having received a Master's of Social Work at Case Western University and
settling  down  for  a  few  years  in  Price  Hill,  Jim  and  his  wife  Eileen  founded  a  nonprofit
educational organization dubbed the Imago Earth Center. Reflecting the cosmological principles
recently reached by the two, “our idea [with Imago],” Jim Schenk says, “was to look at how we
would live if we held the Earth and its people as sacred” (2005:1). At the beginning, it was
largely an  environmental  education center  that  distributed information  to  local  residents  and
schools about sustainability and the local ecosystem. Eventually, though, the Earth Center began
offering an open space for events and demonstrations both connected with and traveling through
the locality. In doing so, the center has seen a large audience over the years from permaculture
workshops,  spiritual  gatherings,  sustainability  talks,  and  other  related  congregations.  In
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particular, the EarthSpirit Rising conference, starting in 1998, has featured prominent speakers
Thomas Berry, Brian Swimme, Miriam MacGillis, John Seed, David Abram, and many other
well-known personalities  of  deep ecology,  permaculture,  and bioregional  gatherings  (Schenk
2006:18).  Subsequently,  the Earth Center  became the basis  for ecological  organizing in East
Price Hill, and the people involved have been some of the largest contributors in the struggle for
ecological place-making within the neighborhood over the past 40 years.
Though  established  directly  on  Enright  Avenue,  Imago's  location  sits  back  several
hundred yards from the street.8 It is quite difficult to even see the center from the road, especially
when trees are in full bloom. As a result of its obscured vision, though, Imago helps anchor
aesthetically and geographically the Hundred-Acre Woods, a forested area in between Enright
and McPherson Avenue. Not only does this aid in connecting the backyards of Enright Avenue to
a green space with hiking trails, natural vegetation, and wild animals, but it also breaks down the
urban-natural barrier  in the re-presentation of specifically socio-natural space.  Thus, the very
first  instance  of  intentionally  imagining  place  in  ecological  equilibrium  was  built  into  the
construction of the Imago Earth Center nearly 30 years prior to the founding of Enright Ridge.9
There was a feeling within the community that more could be done to live harmoniously
with the Earth,  and in  1993,  15 residents of  Price Hill  working under  the banner  of  Imago
decided to  try and build ecological  practices into the community more directly—by actively
8 See Figure 2 in the Appendix.
9    This, however, is a double-edged sword that helps foreshadow the coming critique. Though it was voluntary and 
indeed aligned with the eco-philosophy of  Jim and Eileen to organize the Earth Center in such a way, the effect of 
such an arrangement geographically is essentially spatial marginalization. It can hardly be said that the Earth Center 
“takes place” and has since anchored East Price Hill or even Enright Avenue into a bioregion. Instead, bioregional 
practice seems to be only realizable through its marginalized practice, e.g. through the emergence of Imago well-
offsite of the commercial Warsaw Avenue, tucked away from view of the public and hence from central, urban 
focus. What appears in 1978 is therefore a quite uncomfortable analogy to the kind of “back-to-the-land” self-
marginalization that was running amok in the '70s, only here never realized as such.
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building a more holistic and communal lifestyle (Schenk 2005:1-2). An early concern was the
“blightedness” of the surrounding neighborhood, in which 11 percent of the study area had fallen
to vacancy, and 68 percent was renter-occupied (Loezir 2011: 89). It was quite difficult to obtain
money to realize such a project, and, what's more, the specific flavor of “eco-development” was
a hard sell to the president of the East Price Hill Community Council who favored high-end
commercial  expansion as a means of turning the neighborhood around (Sizemore 2004: 43).
Despite  these  initial  setbacks,  though,  in  1998  “a  grant  opportunity  presented  to  all  city
neighborhoods  through  the  'Community  Investment  Partners'  of  the  Greater  Cincinnati
Foundation provided a great opportunity for Imago to realize their dream of the eco-village”
(Sizemore 2004: 42). Beyond the Greater Cincinnati Foundation, it is important to note, the grant
was funded in cooperation with the United Way private industry partners the Procter & Gamble
Fund and Fifth Third Bank (Sizemore 2004: 58). A partnership of non-profit organizations led by
Imago applied for the grant and they were awarded to the amount of $100,000 each year for 5
years until 2003.
Upon receiving this  grant,  Imago presented a consolidated redevelopment  plan to  the
public. They recruited a class of graduate students at the College of Design, Art, Architecture,
and Planning (DAAP) of the University of Cincinnati to aid in this project, and the “Seminary
Square Eco-Village Work Plan” was subsequently developed (University of Cincinati 1999). This
plan called for the founding of an 'eco-village'  that claimed an approximately 50 block area
located right in the center of East Price Hill.10 As the plan reads,
“East Price Hill is facing challenges typical of urban neighborhoods. There are many  
10 See Figure 3 in the Appendix.
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negative perceptions of Price Hill neighborhoods surrounding trash, deteriorating housing
stock, a faltering business district, and traffic. Fortunately, collaborations involving social
and civic organizations are working to resolve these perceptions. This plan attempts to 
address some of those issues through the inclusion of a mixture of various strategies to 
facilitate the transformation of Seminary Square into an urban Eco-Village by focusing on
design,  housing  policy initatives  and  community based  programming  (University  of  
Cincinnati 1999: v).
The  central  focus  for  the  plan  concerned  the  problem of  housing.  Such  a  task  was  to  be
accomplished first through the improvement of existing housing and housing policy by reducing
energy consumption, rehabilitation of vacant or dilapidated buildings, and then a heavy-handed
encouragement of home ownership. As the work plan explains, “there tends to be a connection
between home ownership and a sense of concern with the future of the area in which a person
lives” (University of Cincinnati 1999: 3). The plan further mentions that, out of the 1589 housing
units  in  Seminary  Square  in  2000,  nearly  32%  are  owner  occupied  with  this  percentage
decreasing every year (University of Cincinnati 1999: 3). There is an acknowledgment that home
ownership is not always on option, but no further “alternatives” are thereafter mentioned, and the
project simply only echoes the general complaint of East Price Hill homeowners in response to
the influx of renters in the neighborhood.
Home ownership remains one of the biggest points of contention in East Price Hill today.
In East Price Hill,  home ownership continues to drop faster than the city's overall rate, with
owner occupied homes in 2012 making up only 36 percent of the homes (Horn 2012). Many
rentals have become subsidized housing for the poor, which is often blamed for deteriorating
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quality, but neighborhood advocates also lay blame on landlords for not taking proper care of
their property (Horn 2012). One such property managed by a landlord in East Price Hill was
described by a local resident as a “slaughterhouse” with respect to its management, property
damage,  bed bug infestations,  and ceiling leaks  (Tweh 2014).  Many also see the amount  of
attention being paid to newly gentrified neighboring areas like Over-the-Rhine or Downtown and
feel as if they are receiving no assistance from the city.  “I believe there are communities in
Cincinnati that are throwaways. They are neglected...Price Hill is one of them,” a local woman
was quoted as saying (Horn 2012). 
The dynamic relationship between these bordering neighborhoods is further noted as a
reason for the decline in home ownership. One local report argues:
With the clearance of public housing from the West End in the late 1990s and English 
Woods a few years later, and the government-supported redevelopment of Over-the-Rhine
since the mid-2000s, some people in these near-West Side neighborhoods say they fear 
their community is becoming Cincinnati's new ghetto (Curnutte 2013).
Poor, transient renters, social services, and subsidized housing all moved in to East Price Hill and
brought the bad water with them. Hence,  the correlation between homeownership and crime
appears as quite obvious and natural: Coolidge (2015) notes that, though in Cincinnati crime is
going down—with one of the most dramatic changes coming from the newly gentrified Over-
the-Rhine—violent crime in East Price Hill increased from 14 reported incidents in 2011 to 25
last  year.  East Price also had 10 homicides in 2012, more than any other city neighborhood
(Curnutte 2013). 
This is reflected in the more personal news coverage of the degrading quality of East
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Price Hill. BieryGolick (2014), for instance, describes the police raid of a “brothel” in East Price
Hill  in late 2014 which led to two men being charged with promoting prostitution and drug
possession. Another police raid on Warsaw Avenue in 2014 led to the arrest of 14 suspected gang
members and drug dealers (Thompson 2014). In the local media, East Price Hill has become a
'problem area'—the kind  of  place  that  Over-the-Rhine  used  to  be.  As Peter  Witte,  a  former
member of the Cincinnati Metropolitan Housing Authority, was quoted as saying: “At the end of
the day, the affordable housing is our blessing and our curse” (Curnutte 2013). 
In such discursive descriptions, what isn't undertaken, though, is the more difficult task of
deeply  and  systemically  explaining  why affordable  housing  appears  to  us  so  necessary  yet
carrying with it such apparent problems. Moreover, how such transience and dilapidation came
to characterize East Price Hill is only bluntly recognized, the extent of which is: 'bad people were
there, and now they are here.' As consisting of many of the city's first suburbs, the West Side of
Cincinnati has been embedded over the past century in the history of blockbusting, segregated
housing plans, and deindustrialization in American cities that requires no extensive explanation
here,  but  there  are  some  important  aspects  that  remain  particularly  pertinent  to  Imago's
aspirations  of  building  an ecologically sustainable  village  and will  help  explain  the  broader
politics of development in which East Price Hill had necessarily been embedded.
Immediately past the train tracks to the east of East Price Hill, before reaching Over-the-
Rhine,  is  a  neighborhood  called  West  End.11 In  the  1910-1940  period,  black  migration  to
Cincinnati  concentrated  here.  By  1940  this  one  neighborhood  had  absorbed  64  percent  of
Cincinnati's  entire  black  population  (Casey-Leininger  1993:  233-235).  Though  there  was
11 See Figure 1 in the Appendix.
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considerable  class  heterogeneity  among  the  residents,  the  neighborhood  remained  racially
homogeneous.  Segregated  housing schemes and the  racialized inequality has  left  West  End
seriously neglected  and deteriorated.  Though  housing  redevelopment  was  attempted  prior  to
World War II,  it  was only after the war, and in accordance with the Cincinnati  metropolitan
master plan of 1948 (Casey-Leininger 1993: 240), that a consolidated effort to clear blightedness
was  brought  onto  the  neighborhood.  This  was  to  be  accomplished  not  through  housing
redevelopment, though, but more as a means of clearing out the criminal element by building a
highway straight through a major residential portion of West End.
* * *
There is  a specific  analysis  which I  will  introduce here that  will  be used recurrently
throughout the rest of this chapter. It heavily relies on the work of the Japanese Marxist Kojin
Karatani and his project in The Structure of World History to reinterpret history not as a history
of modes of production—as 'conventional Marxism' would have it—but rather one of modes of
exchange. Karatani defends this shift by reasoning that, insofar as one only deals with material
processes, one will “never find the moral moment” (Karatani 2014: xix). Karatani brings back
the problematic of difference and argues that the realization of freedom is not first a matter of
production but one fundamentally of intercourse with the other. Karatani draws specifically from
Kant and reasons that  morality is  not a  determination of good and evil  but  one of realizing
freedom,  specifically  by always  treating  the  “other  as  an  end”  and  not  a  means  to  an  end
(Karatani 2014: xix). Thus, freedom is a fundamentally moral question embedded within the
relationship  between  the  self  and  the  other.  Karatani's  Marxism  re-orients  the  question  of
economy in terms of exchange.
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Karatani produces a schematic, a kind of structure of world history on the basis of four
modes of exchange. The first, mode of exchange A, is that of gift-reciprocity. This is the mode
of the “archaic societies in the gift-countergift reciprocal system, under which various items are
given  and  reciprocated,  including  food,  property,  women,  land,  service,  labor,  and  rituals”
(Karatani  2014:  5).  This,  however,  is  not  something  ancient  and  far  away  but  a  mode  of
exchange still present. In the modern social formation, mode of exchange A takes the form of the
nation—the 'imagined' community that, for example, gifts citizenship in exchange for allegiance.
Mode  of  exchange  B  is  plunder  and  redistribution.  When  one  community  simply  plunders
another, this is not an exchange, but, as Karatani remarks, “If a community wants to engage in
continuous plunder, the dominant community cannot simply carry out acts of plunder bust must
also give something to its targets” (Karatani 2014: 6).  The community does this namely in the
form of public works and protection. Hence, in the modern social formation, this takes the form
of the state. The third mode of exchange, C, is capital. For Karatani, this is a mode grounded in
mutual consent. Rather than the coercion of mode of exchange A or the violence implicated in
mode  of  exchange  B,  mode  of  exchange  C  operates  “only  when  the  participants  mutually
recognize each other as free beings” (Karatani 2014: 6). Hence, all of wage labor, commerce, and
the 'free' market in general indeed appear to us as 'free.'  The fourth mode of exchange, D, is
thought of by Karatani as somewhat of a return of mode of exchange A 
in a higher dimension. It is a mode of exchange that is simultaneously free and mutual. 
Unlike the other three modes, mode of exchange D does not exist in actuality. It is the 
imaginary return of the moment of reciprocity that has been repressed under modes of 
exchange  B  and  C.  Accordingly,  it  originally  appeared  in  the  form  of  religious  
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movements (Karatani 2014: 7).
There is much more to be said about Karatani's model, but the important point to draw out here is
that  modes  of  exchange  A,  B,  and C  remain  intertwined,  in  their  respective  modern  social
formations; the whole of capitalist modernity forms a Borromean knot, “linked in such a manner
that all will fall apart if any of the three is missing” (Karatani 2014: xiv). Likewise they are
mutually reinforcing so that, for instance, in the the communist revolutions of the 20 th-century,
capital class relations were upended only to the dramatic overreach of nation and state. Privation
fell only for the implicit unfreedom of Capital-Nation-State to reveal itself in the gulags, state-
sponsored capitalism, and the fetish of the proletarian dictatorship.
Hence,  as  in  the  case  of  West  End,  if  unemployment  is  high,  if  a  neighborhood  is
blighted, another pole of Capital-Nation-State will seek to re-calibrate the knot. We see urban
black displacement in Cincinnati as most directly an instance of mode of exchange B, plunder
and redistribution, and as a correction for the problems grounded in mode of exchange C, or,
more directly here, capitalist class relations. Economically impoverished areas are no help to
capitalist accumulation, and their correction is an important project for the whole Borromean
knot of Capital-Nation-State. Hence, the uprooting of black residents, the plunder of their 'place,'
is simultaneously paired with its redistribution into public infrastructure, which in turn will help
better  facilitate  capital  flow in the city by virtue  of  improved,  faster  transportation;  and,  of
course, this will help foster and perpetuate the American dream in the '50s of a nuclear family
with a white picket fence in the peaceful suburbs and easy access to a day job in the city, which
is  itself  a  way  to  re-arrange  capital  investment  geographically  and  renew  the  process  of
accumulation in rural areas—which, as a result of technological dynamism, has seen diminishing
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returns in recent years—by developing farmland and turning it into suburbs, and the cycle of
Capital-Nation-State.
Prior to construction, the predominately black population was to be compensated from
imminent  domain  through  assured  alternate  housing  built  by  the  Cincinnati  Metropolitan
Housing Authority (CMHA). The relocation of black residents to new public housing had proven
quite difficult, though, as area white residents, in typical NIMBY fashion, pressured the Housing
Authority to constantly move public housing elsewhere. What little had been completed by the
CMHA in 1955, on the eve of the construction of the expressway, had rapidly been filled by
displaced black residents. Consequently, private builders ended up producing “most of the new
construction in the metropolitan area,” and these largely consisted of “single-family houses at
prices well above the means of people living in the basin slums” (Casey-Leininger 1993: 241).
White residents, too, had been cleared from the area of that would be the new highway network:
“the Planning Commission proposed to start the program in African American tracts in the West
End, after  which it  intended to send bulldozers to Over-the-Rhine, the predominantly white”
neighborhood just to the east (Miller & Tucker 1998: 37). Generally, however, whites were able
to afford the housing opportunities of the private industry, and, in addition, even for blacks with
adequate income, “discrimination confined most black home buyers to areas in which houses
were forty or more years old,” homes which “carried higher down payments, shorter mortgage
periods, and higher maintenance requirements that tended to force the monthly shelter costs to
levels as high or higher than those for whites in the same income bracket” (Casey-Leininger
1993: 247).
Consequently, there was a massive housing shortage in Cincinnati through the mid-1950s
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that was quite racialized, and this was exacerbated by the plans of private sector housing fully
intending to sustain racial segregation. This was accomplished mainly through the relocation and
concentration of the transient black population of West End to multi-family rental housing in
parts of Avondale. This link was no mere coincidence but was indeed directly and openly racial:
Several housing projects in Avondale were subsidized specifically to those people “displaced
from  urban  renewal  sites”  (Casey-Leininger  1993:  242).  The  effect  was  that  the  black
community remained segregated, restricted to the same housing arrangements of poor quality.
The city encouraged this philosophy:
Important  city  officials  defended  segregated  housing  and  thus  presumably  favored  
channeling black relocatees to black or changing neighborhoods...in 1959 the head of  
Cincinnati's Department of Urban Development,  the local agency in charge of urban  
renewal, in a statement to the press, defended placing segregated black relocation housing
in Avondale and in other black or changing areas. And in 1961 the chief of the city's  
housing burea, in his annual report to the city manager, spelled out how whites might  
defend their neighborhoods from blacks seeking housing there (Casey-Leininger 1993:  
242).
In 1950, Avondale was 86 percent white (Curnutte 2012). Ten years later, in 1960, 56 percent of
Avondale's population was black—representing both the movement of displaced blacks coming
from West End in addition to an increase of 30,500 to Cincinnati's black population in the 1950s
—and almost all were concentrated to what would become a large contiguous ghetto in Avondale
(Casey-Leninger 1993: 243). From 1940 to 1970, West End's total population fell from 62,363 to
17,068, and its black population fell from 37,369 to 16,509 (Casey-Leininger 1993: 233). The
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problem of poverty remained, now shared between the highly-concentrated ghettos of West and
and the ghetto in Avondale which would later absorb Walnut Hills and Corryvilel by 1970 (Mller
& Tucker 1998: 48). Over-the-Rhine, between West End and Avondale, was championed by its
poor white population as a kind of Appalachian enclave that preserved itself against the black
ghettos to the west and east. This narrative collapsed in by the 1970s, as Over-the-Rhine  became
the central hub of Cincinnati's new black ghetto. In 1960, 30,000, mostly white Appalachian
residents lived in Over-the-Rhine in 1960, but by 1990, there were only 9,752 people living
there, and 6,875 (71 percent) were black (Miller & Tucker 1998: xix).
In sum, a capitalist geography of difference continually reproduces a place that is both
poor and black. Racialized poverty in the urban built environment is a ghost which follows the
black relocatee wherever he or she sets root. Housing segregation and discrimination were the
rules by which black residents of Cincinnati were forced to play throughout the middle of the
20th-century (Casey-Leininger 1993: 248). The state has not fought poverty directly but rather
displaced it—clearing blightedness by dropping in its place a highway system. Engels describes
this exact same process in The Housing Question and defines it as 'Hausmann'—the method by
which the bourgeois city planners split working class quarters for the public good and thereby
move  inequality  somewhere  else.  Whether  the  specific  concern  is  of  aesthetics,  health,  or
infrastructure, city planners move in and 'redevelop' blighted areas, but in the hope of relieving
the criminal element or the undesirables at large, the result is always the same: 'problem areas'
are never resolved but simply relocated:
The infamous holes and cellars in which the capitalist mode of production confines our 
workers night after night, are not abolished; they are merely shifted elsewhere! The same 
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economic necessity that produced them in the first place, produces them in the next place 
also. As long as the capitalist mode of production continues to exist, it is folly to hope for 
an isolated solution of the housing question or of any other social question affecting the 
fate of the workers (Engels [1887] 2000: 77).
The 'economic necessity' to which Engels is referring is the process of capital accumulation. This
is  to  say  that  the  circulation  of  capital—defined  as  M-C-M'—is  by  definition  spiraling
accumulation, and we can see this play out not merely in the relative economic disparity between
people but indeed it manifests in the very spatial reproduction of any capitalist society. Economic
growth is hence as much a relative part of capital accumulation as is the inevitable and measly
compensation of impoverished laborers, the geography of economic inequality, the reserve army
population of the floating proletariat, and so on. Blightedness is hence not something that can be
fixed within a geography subordinate to the logic of capital, but instead it is a fundamental aspect
of this capitalist geography.
What we directly witness, though—and what appears on the surface as we read the media
reports  of  brothels,  crime,  and  transience—is  the  appearance  of  the  political  economy  of
development and not this material process. That is, the sphere of our contact is one of discursive
exchange, one that carries presuppositions of a wholly different character than what seemingly
defines production. Marx indeed makes direct note of this in Capital, calling this appearance the
very  “Eden  of  the  innate  rights  of  man.  There  alone  rule  Freedom,  Equality,  Property  and
Bentham” (Marx [1867] 1992: 121). Thus, what compels our categories of understanding under a
predominantly capitalist mode of exchange is a particular appearance of the world as inherently
free and equal, as one's value and individuality being one's own—e.g. liberal democracy—and
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these are the bourgeois beliefs under which capitalism operates, accepted and willingly practiced
by the proletariat.  Unlike the gift exchange which necessitates coerced reciprocity or plunder
which necessitates the state's 'social contract' and a monopoly on violence, the capitalist mode of
exchange, as Karatani rightly notes, operates on this mutual consent, but only such, I add, that it
is apparent (2014: 14). What I mean by this is to say that mutual content occurs in the realm of
appearance, that of exchange, but it does not occur in production, where workers are frequently
coerced to work longer hours for less compensation,  particularly in industrializing countries.
Many wage laborers do not give consent per se but are forced into these roles by virtue of their
total  social,  economic,  and  cultural  position  as  a  means  of  producing  and  reproducing
themselves, their labor-power, and their families.
Underlying this appearance, the perpetually running process of identifying and making
universal the values of the leader is what Gramsci means when he refers to cultural hegemony. It
is important to note that this does not mean that these values constitute anything like a 'false'
ideology or mirage. Rather, they constitute spectral objectivity. It is a “subjective” universality
that is felt, thought, and practiced; indeed, the reproduction of consciousness is part and parcel of
the very real process by which capitalism sustains itself. It may be said that people are duped into
“believing” in a free world when they are in reality completely unfree, but whether or not this is
generally true, it is besides the point. It is more relevant to say that freedom itself exists as a
binding ephemeral reality that, like the specter of place or commodity, both is and is not there.
Freedom is necessitated by the same process, capitalism, which definitively denies its capacity to
exist. What is unique about capitalist society is that the wage laborer toils on the condition that
he appears to be 'free' to do so, free to quit or work somewhere else. Yet, in another sense, the
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wage laborer  is  a  wage  laborer  precisely because  he  or  she  is  not  free—the  proletariat  are
required to be such or else they will not be able to survive. They are no longer free to own the
means of production—their own labor-power included—but are in fact freed from these means.
We must also realize that the Enlightenment, as the 'spirit,' so to speak, of capitalism, was
also the harbinger of a degree of injustice, intolerance, and unfreedom on a scale the world had
never before seen—precisely, again, as a result of the universalization of the Enlightened subject
as he attempted to represent the colonized other and bring backwards people toward civilization,
toward freedom. The gap between these two poles—between Enlightenment liberalism on the
one hand and serious material  misery on the other—is the vacuum in which power assumes
itself. It is this difference that allows freedom to also assume the dynamics of domination via the
apparatus of empire.
Racism introduces itself here as a technique of power, one related to what Karatani calls
mode  of  exchange  A:  gift-reciprocity.  Whereas  the  state  is  the  embodiment  of  plunder  and
redistribution, the nation for Karatani appears as gift-reciprocity. As Karatani investigates tribal,
pre-capitalist, and pre-state society, he notices that underlying the appearance of gift in tribal
society was the always-apparent compulsion toward reciprocity. A 'gift' in this sense was not as
purely one-sided as its name implies, but rather a full mode of exchange, the purpose of which is
often to gain a kind of power over others specifically through this relation. Hence, the potlatch of
some indigineous tribes of North America is not a pure gift but rather a full economy where
“recipients attempt to overpower their rivals by giving back even more than they have received.
Potlatch  is  not  itself  warfare,  but  resembles  warfare  in  that  the  motive  behind it  is  to  gain
supremacy over one's  rivals” (Karatani  2014:  12).  As what  is  embodied by the modern day
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nation, though, this form of exchange embeds itself much deeper into the structure of society
than its appearance in seemingly unrelated tribal economies:
There are also cases of gift giving that seem not to follow this tendency. For example,  
membership in a community is something bestowed as a gift as soon as one is born. Each 
member bears an obligation to reciprocate for this. The force by which the community 
constrains each of its members is the force of this sort of reciprocity. For this reason, with
the community there is no particular need to impose penalties in cases where a member 
violates the norms (rules). Once it is known to the community at large that a member has 
violated the norms that is the end: to be abandoned by the community is equivalent to  
death (Karatani 2014: 12).
Difference appears as inevitable, and how much threshold there is in the violation of norms is
arbitrary, determined by hegemony. Even more, 'violating the norms' assumes an agency over
one's actions that is not always possible—despite our compulsion to assume innately the concept
of freedom—in light of what appears to be structural inequality. If home ownership or rootedness
is a norm of the community, for instance, what if such a norm apparently evades any material
possibility not given one's agency but simply one's socio-spatial position? What if, moreover, its
possibility is superseded by the state through imminent domain as in the case of West End? 
In the case of the history of home ownership in Cincinnati, racism is then a kind of suture
between our understanding of freedom and equality in exchange, the reproduction of 'nation' in
the  form  of  community,  and  an  inherently  unfree  and  unjust  mode  of  production.  Racism
attempts to explain the correlation between urban black residents, transience, and the ghetto. A
way to reconcile their plight in a city like Cincinnati and the reality of disproportionately high
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crime and poverty in black communities is to say that it is something inherent to them as others
—as beyond the norms of the imagined community—and not internal to that capitalist society
which appears as free, equal, just, and so on. Hence, an overt racist would then say that black
people, by a some specific quality of their otherness, create ghettos and therefore ruin property
value, homeownership, the common good, etc. 
Today, this is an unspeakable sentiment, but it nevertheless remains buried within the
modern social formation. Racism is no longer identified with “blackness” as such but with the
indirect, disproportionate qualities of being black in urban America: namely, for my purposes
here, transience and non-home ownership. According to the 2000 U.S. Census, the West End in
2000 was  80% African  American,  45% of  households  were  below poverty,  and  the  median
family income was $17,487 (Maloney & Auffrey 2004). Thus, when one pairs the “clearance of
public housing from the West End in the late 1990s” with the rise of crime and decline of home
ownership  in  East  Price  Hill,  it  is  important  to  make  clear  the  long,  racialized  history  of
transience in Cincinnati that led to the clearing out of West End (Curnutte 2013). The question of
why being black and being transient have been correlated never breaches the surface. As an
example,  in  response to  two shootings in  Price Hill—all  involved were black—on the same
block over a single weekend in 2004, East Price Hill Improvement Association President Frank
Hollister  said,  “'I  think it's  deplorable what has happened around here...Basically,  when they
closed the West End we got overrun with those people and they brought drugs, violence and
prostitution  with  them”  (qt.  in  Hansel  2004).  “Those  people,”  those  others,  are  never  seen
embedded within a system and always seen as others, as personally embodying the problems of
urban neighborhoods. Racism is a way of reconciling 'those people' and the apparent suffering of
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their lot with the freedom and equality of which we take to be the fabric of American society. It
is never considered whether being an nomadic undesirable indeed rests upon the structure of
Capital-Nation-State, or whether blightedness is indeed a condition of power settled within a
geography of difference.
* * *
Returning now to the ecovillage project of Imago, in order to bandage with the recent
wound of transience, the plan calls for the establishment of the Seminary Square Eco-Housing
Center, in which information on housing would be disseminated, rehabilitation services would be
offered, and the Seminary Square and “Eco-Village theme” were to be showcased and marketed
(University of Cincinnati 1999:17). Hence, the promotion of sustainability practices, greening
rehabilitation projects, and the like would be consolidated within this Eco-Housing Center which
can  push the  “Eco-Village  theme” that  “will  create  a  ripple  effect  that  encourages  business
development and create a neighborhood jobs, which in turn can boost and stabilize the economic
vitality and community stability” (University of Cincinnati 1999:20).
As  this  plan  was  presented,  City  of  Cincinnati  Planning  Division  were  finishing  a
business district renewal plan for Warsaw Avenue, the commercial street that cut directly through
the middle of Seminary Square (Sizemore 2004:59).12 Jim Schenk had met with the planers and
expressed his interest to include the eco-village concept alongside what the state had planned for
business renewal, but his ideas were ignored: “The eco-village plan was taken to the planning
commission, acknowledged for its existence and idea, but was not officially adopted” (Sizemore
2004:59). Moreover, the Cincinnati Metropolitan Housing Authority had proposed a low-income,
12 See Figure 3 in the Appendix.
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multi-family, rental development project that directly contested the heart of the housing ethic
espoused by the “Seminary Square Eco-Village Work Plan” (1999). Though the city's proposal
never came to fruition, the irrelevance of their work plan to state officials nevertheless struck a
psychological blow to the desires of Community Partners and Imago in establishing an eco-
village,  as  their  efforts  seemed  to  go  against  the  grain  of  commercial  and  private  land
development.
In  2000,  half-way through  the  5-year  CIP grant,  Community Partners  reassessed  the
Seminary Square Eco-Village and ultimately decided that it was no longer financially feasible
nor penetrated deeply enough to the core issues of this urban neighborhood. The influx of black
residents into the community had not gone unnoticed, and it appeared as if the eco-village did
not resonate with this growing population. Thus, in late 2000, Community Partners decided that
“with the remaining money, it was time to hire an outside planning consultant to help develop a
strategic  plan for  all  of  Price Hill,  including the Seminary Square Eco-village.  Among their
greatest concerns was to address the need of engaging the new poor black residents” (Sizemore
2004:61). This would eventually lead into the formation of a coalition called Price Hill Will that
initiated a series of interviews from 2001-2002 of Price Hill residents, collaborating with local
churches, block groups, and schools to get a better understanding of the kinds of improvements
that the community wanted to see for itself. (Table 1 in the Appendix is the consolidated effort of
Price Hill Will to respond to the community's needs.) 
Despite the involvement of the local community, the two most visible and appreciated
efforts that the organization has had on Price Hill have been the Buy-Improve-Sell rehabilitation
program and the revitalization of the so-called business area known as the “Incline District”
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(“Price  Hill  Plan”  2014).  Hence,  what  becomes  most  apparent  and  appreciated  in  a
predominantly capitalist mode of exchange are capitalist class relations. At the same time, this
does indeed carry with it the underlying pursuits of nation and state. First, the City of Cincinnati
support of the Plan acts here on behalf of the state, in addition to the Planning & Buildings
Department, Trade & Development Department, and the Department of Transport & Engineering
representing key funding resources for the projects in Price Hill (“Price Hill Plan” 2014). On
behalf  of  the exchange relations which constitute  the nation,  Price Hill  Will  and constituent
organizations like Keep Cincinnati Beautiful, BLOC, and other community councils are active in
producing the gift of community in exchange for residents' support and perpetuation of the fight
for home ownership—to the exclusion of those transient renters. These are enacted and intimated
on what remains a predominantly capitalist society, where money situates state and nation, but all
are inextricably linked.
The predominance of capitalist class relations has come full bloom most recently in Price
Hill with the dramatic investment and reshaping of the Incline District.  In a sleek work plan
presented in 2014 by the Economics Center of the Lindner College of Business of the University
of Cincinnati, and in partnership with Urban Land Institute Cincinnati, the project of the “Price
Hill Incline District” declared:
Cincinnati's  Price  Hill  Incline  District  is  named  for  the  historic  Price  Hill  Incline  
transportation system, which carried passengers from Eighth Street 350 feet up the slope 
of the steep hill. Built in 1874, it brought thousands of new residents to the neighborhood,
many of them German or Irish. Olden View Park marks the top of the Incline, which was 
operated until 1943. The Price Hill Incline District Market Area exemplifies the trend of 
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residential, commercial and civic investment and development in urban neighborhoods  
after decades of shifts in population outside of the urban core. Neighborhoods that are  
rich in infrastructure, historic resources, arts and culture, community engagement and  
leadership can overcome past disinvestment and thrive—by providing an environment  
that is updated to reflect modern attitudes regarding healthy and vibrant urban places  
(Economics Center 2014).
This is the full Capitalist-Nation-State swing of gentrification. Within what became of the initial
“Seminary  Square  Work  Plan”  (1999)  was  the  total  coalescing  of  a  state-sponsored  urban
redevelopment program, capital investment, and the revitalization of 'community' norms of home
ownership through Buy-Improve-Sell. The Price Hill Incline District is a gentrification project
that dedicates its namesake to a defunct and all but forgotten Incline during a time when Price
Hill was far less transient and wasn't nearly as racially heterogeneous as it is today. Recalling
from the earlier remarks on xenophobia and solipsism, nothing seems to be clearer of the present
anxiety over placelessness—in addition to the historical reproduction of a community—than the
nostalgic preservation of a bygone Incline. A nod toward the Price Hill Incline is temporal and
spatial xenophobia; it is a digging in of one's heels and a mimic of the rootedness of the entire
West Side of Cincinnati.
In March 2015, one year after the introduction of the Price Hill Incline District Market
Area by the Economics Center, Price Hill Will was awarded a $500,000 grant from Wells Fargo
to acquire homes, rehab them, and put more homeowners into Price Hill (Backscheider 2015).
One  should  recall  what  Jim  Schenk  said  about  the  nature  of  Seminary  Square  in  its  early
tentative  days:  “It's  isn't  about  gentrification...it's  about  stopping  the  blight”  (Vaccariello
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2000:59). Yet there is no such thing as removing blight under capitalism, only displacing it, and
East Price Hill was an accumulation of transience and slums embedded within a long historical
geography of ghettos in Cincinnati at the time when Seminary Square was first envisioned. From
the vantage point of the subject living in East Price Hill, blight can be stopped and can disappear,
but it merely becomes a problem for that other over there rather than here. Xenophobia, fear of
the  encroaching  unknown,  is  thus  resolved  solely  through  solipsism,  both  politically  and
spatially. At the present moment, it is difficult to tell where the next blighted area will emerge;
but, rest assured, it will emerge, for the conditions that produce poverty continue to act in full
force.  Even  more,  though,  what  becomes  clear  in  the  eventual  turnout  of  the  ecovillage
aspirations of Seminary Square is  that  it  was,  after  all,  quite plainly the rearrangement of a
political geography of difference through the mechanism of gentrification.
Imago II: Enright Ridge
The  “Seminary Square  Eco-Village  Work  Plan”  (1999)  was  eventually  translated  via
Capital-Nation-State from an ecologically sustainable 'life-place' to gentrification. What was in
thought  an  inclusive  and  holistic  community  lifestyle  by  way  of  living-in-place  became  in
practice  subordinate  and  indeed  compliant  with  an  exclusionary  political  geography  of
difference, in which capital, people, and 'nature' are all distributed. In light of this, the philosophy
of place has so far remained space qua difference, clearly defined within political, economic, and
social boundaries. And yet, we must here again remember that such a philosophy is unsettling:
this representation is in fact indicative of the aporia and the spectral quality of place, always
already implying space as a thing-in-itself which lies beyond representation. Any philosophy that
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has so far claimed a knowledge beyond or before representation has turned out to be solipsistic in
Karatani's  sense,  and  the  politics  of  place  as  a  result  never  transcends  the  problematic  of
difference. 'Speaking for' nature is not liberating, in other words, but brought about via exclusion,
namely, of the transient and the urban poor. It is the task of this final section to sketch out a
political ontology of place that counters the modern social formation of Capital-Nation-State,
one that comes to terms with difference not as the in-between mechanism of space and place
mediated by power—hence not with an appeal to absolute space or to 'bioregion'—but one that
comes to be as a transcendent response to how place is actually experienced. What if, in other
words, instead of place defined a priori to be space qua difference, place is seen as purely actual,
lived difference, with no extension into those concepts like 'space' or 'new cosmology' that lie
beyond what is knowable? 
Despite all of the setbacks, the Enright Ridge Urban Ecovillage (ERUEV) was founded
three years after Price Hill Will was formed, and a second attempt to practice life-place in East
Price Hill was thus initiated. In this second attempt, by virtue of the practice of bioregionalism
imbricated as it is within Enright Ridge's geography, is not 'bioregion' but  pure  difference. In
other words, Enright Ridge is a clear example of what Wylie calls the 'ecotone': “rather than
being  a  mosaic  of  putatively independent  and exclusionary units,  any biotic  environment  is
effectively all edge-effect: ecotones or fuzzy boundaries 'all the way down'” (2012: 31). Enright
Ridge represents precisely this dynamic edge. To respond to the aporia of place, what is needed
to understand ontically is neither that resistance should dwell in place or that we are presently
placeless but rather that living in resistance as such always lies on the boundary between the two
—in pure, relative spatial difference. 
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A dominant bioregionalism would correct the positivist subject by marginalizing him or
her in context with the sentient life-place, and, even more, against the cosmological arrangement
of the godhead. The first instance of 'we are Nature,' after all, is to say that 'we are natural,' and
this  is  perhaps  the  most  penetrating  critique  against  the  externalization  of  nature  present  in
positivist objectivity. A dominant positivism, on the other hand, would correct the mystification
of bioregionalism and its faulty quest to 'speak for'  nature.  “We are not merely Nature,” the
positivist would argue, “we are distinct if nothing else than by virtue of our capacity to reason.”
Positivism would rightly critique the strategy of bioregionalism as anthropomorphizing the earth,
as extending our claims not to scientific objectivity but to religious and subjective ends. The
parallax between, however, would be to at one and the same time marginalize the human subject
without resorting to any new dogma to stand in its place.
I  propose  a  transversal,  comparative  analysis  between  Seminary  Square  and  an
ecologically sustainable lifestyle in East Price Hill. On the one hand, there is the social formation
of Capital-Nation-State and its embodiment within the development of Price Hill Will and the
Price Hill Incline District; on the other, there is the actual existence of the Enright Ridge Urban
Ecovillage:  an  intentional  community that  seemingly works  against  this  structure  simply by
virtue of its striving for sustainability. To see what lies beyond the appearance, however, one
must heed the parallax between the two attempts. Living-in-place, as it had been thought and
dreamed in Seminary Square, is not what occurs at Enright Ridge but rather a kind of living that
does not actually exist as such. This is what I have come to call living-as-if. What I mean by this
is that ecovillagers do not live in bioregional 'life-place' here on Enright Avenue or anywhere
else. Instead, I argue, ecovillagers only ever live-as-if: they live via representations of difference,
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purely  on  the  marginal  boundary,  and,  in  fact,  this  is  the  only  possibility  of  place-bound
resistance today. In this spectral living, what is able to be discerned and explicitly defined is then
that the limits of the kind of place-claiming that had been hoped for in Seminary Square reduce
resistance always to a status of as-if.
* * *
In 2004, the Eco-neighborhood Action Team was planned by Price Hill Will in order to
try and save the concept of the Seminary Square Eco-Village, but this was to no avail. Seminary
Square as an eco-village project—and, more importantly,  as a place-claiming for the sake of
ecological harmony—had failed. Today, there is no Seminary Square Eco-Village, no talk of its
work plan, and no Seminary Square Eco-Housing Center. In its aftermath, Schenk summarized
four fundamental reasons for the project's failure. First, the project began in the most deteriorated
area of Price Hill, and so the costs of development were more than expected. This is also what
had been observed in the midterm reassessment. Second, there was a huge influx of “relatively
transient renters into the neighborhood at this time,” something that was indeed identified by the
initial work plan but never seemed to be settled (Schenk 2005:2). Third, Jim argued that the 50-
block area was larger than they were able to manage, and, lastly, there was not enough interest
and commitment by residents in the area (Schenk 2005:2). 
Founding an  ecovillage  directly  on  Enright  Avenue,  the  location  of  the  Imago Earth
Center, would occur to Jim Schenk in 2004 after  the Eco-neighborhood Action Team had not
met its goal. As opposed to Seminary Square, there seemed a potential in Enright Avenue to
transcend the aforementioned shortcomings. For instance, though Enright Ridge would consist of
both ecovillagers and non-members down the long cul-de-sac, the total population is far smaller.
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As a result, financing and pulling together a community would be much less daunting. Secondly,
most  of  the  residents  were  already  homeowners,  and  so  they  would  not  face  the  kind  of
deterioration that occurred due to rentals and landlords. Thirdly, though there are foreclosures
and vacancies on the street, Enright Avenue is tucked away from the commercial district13 and
interspersed with forestry connecting the backyards, thus considerably less blighted and far less
of  an  overhaul  than  was  needed  in  redeveloping  the  entirety  of  Warsaw Avenue.  For  these
reasons, the Enright Ridge Urban Ecovillage could manage to do, it appeared, what Seminary
Square could not.
In 2004, Enright Ridge initially began putting in practice on Enright Avenue the same
strategy that had predominantly made up the work for Seminary Square and Price Hill Will:
buying up foreclosed homes, retrofitting them for energy efficiency, and selling them back on the
market, only now with the added, non-mandatory invitation of membership into a new urban
ecovillage. While this practice remains one of the most significant activities of Enright Ridge,
this is not what has made it into an urban intentional community.  To encourage this kind of
growth, the ecovillage has held near-weekly potlucks and other community events, continues to
organize workshops and seminars geared toward permaculture and green energy, and has pursued
communal  sustainability projects  such as  digging wells  for geothermal  energy and installing
solar panels. In 2005, Enright Ridge also started a community newsletter, entitled  The Ridge
Runner, which details local happenings around the community, updates members on particular
projects, includes a few creative writing pieces, and advertises upcoming events and workshops.
Since the ecovillage's initial formation in 2004, members have also added quite a bit of formal
13 See Figure 4 in the Appendix.
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structure to the organization of the community. As of 2015, Enright Ridge has a full board of
committees, including the Enright Green Group Task Force (EGG), the Membership Committee,
the  Farm Project,  the  Housing Committee,  the  Communications  Committee  (“Enright  Ridge
Urban Ecovillage” 2015).
Perhaps  most  significantly,  though,  in  2009,  Enright  Ridge  founded  a  community-
supported agriculture (CSA) program. “The ERUEV has been working for years  to create a
sustainable  city  neighborhood,”  profess  Schenk  and  local  resident  Julie  Hotchkiss  in  the
introduction of a guide they made for urban CSAs, “and the urban farm project is part of the
vision” (2013:1). Headquartered at a former florist's greenhouse near the ecovillage, the CSA has
been built as a work co-op where members pay a fee and agree to work 40 hours over the course
of a 26-week season from May to October. In return, they receive a weekly share for 25 weeks
including a variety of produce like greens, herbs, corn, eggplant, potatoes, peppers, and broccoli.
Since its founding in 2009, the Enright Ridge CSA continues to grow in land and shares every
year (Schenk & Hotchkiss 2013). 
Initially,  the  farmland  had  entirely  consisted  of  volunteered  backyards  down Enright
Avenue, but it has since expanded to include several other plots. One of is an acre of land in
nearby Sayler Park. More significantly, though, the CSA has also expanded into public land. The
Cincinnati Metropolitan Housing Authority had reclaimed property where dilapidated housing
was razed in East Price Hill,  and Enright Ridge has been granted permission to include this
multi-acre plot into the CSA project (Schenk & Hotchkiss 2013). The flourishing of community
gardens and urban farms was something that the City had been encouraging as early as 2009,
when  the  Urban  Agriculture  Program,  initiated  by  the  Cincinnati  Health  Department,  was
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founded in order  to  convert  vacant  City-owned property like that  existing in  Price Hill  into
community-based  gardens  (“Urban  Agriculture  in  Cincinnati  Quality  of  Life  Committee
Meeting” 2011:2). 
It seems only natural, then, that the City would welcome the work of Enright Ridge into
'beautifying' the neighborhood and fighting for urban food justice. In fact, since the formation of
the  Enright  Ridge  CSA,  the  City  has  only  further  emphasized  the  importance  of  urban
agriculture, citing  its many benefits including food security, good health, increasing green space
in the City, neighborhood safety, “empowerment,” job production, “neighborhood enrichment,”
and saving “the city money” as “city properties in agricultural use do not have to be maintained
at the city's  expense” (“Urban Agirculture in Cincinnati  Quality of Life Commitee Meeting”
2011:1-2).  In  2011,  Lauren  Niemes  of  the  Nutrition  Council  addressed  the  Cincinnati  City
Council  Health,  Environment  and  Education  Committee  and  stressed  the  importance  of  the
continued increase of urban farms and community gardens:
I  encourage  the  City  of  Cincinnati  to  support  through  policies  and  leadership  the  
expansion  of  community  gardens  in  Cincinnati  including  neighborhood  and  school  
gardens.  Urban  agriculture  (growing  food  for  profit)  has  the  potential  to  link  
environmental,  social  justice,  economic  development,  youth  development  and public  
health strategies to improve the quality of life for our most vulnerable urban populations
—people living on limited incomes, without a car and at high risk for chronic diseases 
(“Urban Agriculture in Cincinnati Quality of Life Committee Meeting” 2011:3-4).
The City has shown quite a bit  of support to this  program, expanding its  presence in urban
agriculture  to  six  publicly-owned  community  gardens  around  Cincinnati  in  addition  to  the
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aforementioned program that grows gardens into vacant city landholdings. At the level of the
politics of development in Cincinnati, the Enright Ridge CSA aligns with the City's vision for
community gardening and urban agriculture because it costs the city less to maintain its own land
and because it provides a better image of Cincinnati on all scales and discourses as a progressive,
'green' city. Cincinnati advertises a livable city amid a consumptive, polluted, and post-industrial
West and hence to increase the City's tax base and economic growth.
In order to view Enright Ridge critically, a similar analysis as had been performed with
Seminary Square is again in need of articulation here. Whereas Seminary Square gentrified a
neighborhood under a capitalist geography, the appearances of Enright Ridge and the CSA are
different. Enright Ridge has not made the same kind of compromises to larger forces of capital,
nation,  or state and neither has it  spurred the same kind of economic investment.  There are
several subversive elements  to which Enright  Ridge can take credit.  First,  it  still  retains the
ecologically-oriented  community  lifestyle  and  aesthetic  as  Seminary  Square  had  hoped  to
accomplish. Second, Enright Ridge is indeed actively localizing food production, absolving the
division  between  producer  and  consumer,  increasingly  pushing  for  net-neutral  energy
independence,  and  claiming  this  all  within  the  place  and  politics  of  a  locally-determined
ecovillage.  All  of  this  rubs  against  the  path  of  humanity  toward  environmental  crises  by
encouraging personal action, localization, less consumption, and so on. 
Changing the culture through these sorts of practices is the conscious intention here, as an
Enright Ridge ecovillager had once written: 
We can no longer deny the environmental crisis. While issues such as global warming and
rapid species extinction are being accepted as real by science and state, they are but  
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symptoms of the created disease that lies within the web of our culture. In a time when 
humans have depleted many of the Earth's resources and changed the nature of nature 
herself, the only thing we can do to begin healing from our mistakes is to begin thinking 
ecologically (Reidel 2008:55).
My purpose is  to  see whether  or  not  'thinking ecologically'  at  the local  scale  and changing
'culture' will eventually arrive somewhere past the present environmental crisis. Enright Ridgers
certainly think ecologically,  but  to what extent are  the present  ecological  practices resolving
crises that have so far seemed intrinsic to the modern and global social formation of Capital-
Nation-State? 
Firstly,  there is an immense problem of spatial and temporal scale at play.  Similar to
judging climate solely by specific weather evens,  it  is  very hard to tell  whether or not such
microscopic  practices  within  such  a  short  time-frame  are  making  a  difference  to  what  are
incredibly global and centuries-long crises that humanity faces. The present understanding in
Enright Ridge, though, is that localization is the direction to take and indeed the antidote to the
illness  of  our  time.  This  conclusion  is  arrived  at,  one should  recall,  in  the  same gesture  of
bioregionalism,  where restoring “membership in a community is one essential prerequisite to
bioregional living” (McGinnis 2000: 84). Upon her investigation of Enright Ridge, Loezir (2011)
similarly notes that the fix of environmental justice is destined to be within a “small scaled area
where people spend most of their time. By experiencing environmental issues in practice, people
can recognize and understand them, taking charge for natural resources maintenance and pride
for the visibility of their actions” (114).  It is hence visibility and contact that is key to bring
conflicts, responsibility, and power down to the level of community. This, however, always leads
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to the question: what is truly made 'visible' by virtue of our local actions?
There  is  a  very  apparent  reality  in  Enright  Ridge  of  a  community  building  toward
harmonious and sustainable lifestyles. At the level of the individual and of the locale, this occurs,
and  no  one  on  the  outside  could  falsify  that  image  for  the  ecovillager  living  there.  In
contradistinction to this, though, is the fact that places like Enright Ridge are never simply 'of
their own' and do not necessarily appear identical at any point on the vertical or horizontal scale.
They are always already constituted by and constitutive of other places both smaller (the family
and  the  individual)  and  larger  (the  city)  in  scope,  in  addition  to  being  represented  by  and
representing different places transpositionally—how the ecovillage sees itself against my writing
about the ecovillage from a library in Columbus, Ohio, for instance. This complex geography, in
a nutshell, is the problematic of difference in the spatial sense as I have tried to describe. To say
something substantive with respect to this is always to speak relatively. Hence, as we saw before,
what appeared as a clearing of blightedness in the West End could be seen as such only insofar as
the  larger  geographic  process  of  displacement  was  ignored.  Likewise,  what  appears  here  as
ecological sustainability might only be as such insofar as the broader spatial relations of capital,
nation, and state are again ignored. Harvey recognizes precisely this point in what he calls the
“myths” of the new urban. One such myth is that 
community solidarity (often 'local') can provide the stability and power needed to control,
manage, and alleviate urban problems and that 'community'  can substitute for public  
politics. Opposed to this is the recognition that 'community,' insofar as it exists, is an  
unstable configuration relative to the conflictual processes that generate,  sustain, and  
eventually undermine it, and that insofar as it does acquire permanence it is frequently an 
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exclusionary and oppressive social form that can be as much at the root of urban conflict 
and urban degeneration as it can be a panacea for political-economic difficulties (1996: 
437).
How such local communities are “exclusionary and oppressive” can sometimes be quite difficult
to discern and must be situated in broader relations. Recall that Schenk (2006) cited an influx of
transient renters as one of the reasons for the demise of Seminary Square. At the level of the
local, all that appears is the incoming of poor, the expansion of blightedness, and the decline of
home ownership,  none  of  which  effectively reveal  the  long  history and  wide  geography of
ghettos, displacement, and the compulsion toward rent in Cincinnati. What is not seen internal to
Schenk's (2006) comments and neither can be discerned from immediate direct investigation
within the locality is a schematic for the conditions within the urban process that compelled the
ecovillagers  onto  the  tucked away Enright  Avenue;  neither  is  there  any way to  reason why
ghettos have been so concentrated in East Price Hill in the first place; and neither, resoundingly,
is there any attempt to understand that arrangement of social relations that demands transience in
a  particular  section  of  society and why this  necessitates  their  incompatibility with an  urban
ecovillage. It  is to these questions that I now return,  and it  is only in light of these broader
relations that Enright Ridge can be considered exclusive.
Confronted  with  the  apparent,  local  reality of  a  particular  spatial  arrangement  in  the
failure of Seminary Square,  there is  a  bioregional  praxis  that  emerges and necessitates  both
rootedness  and localization as primary means for taking place.  Specifically,  the assumptions
within defining transient renters and the largeness of 50 blocks demands a conformity to, first,
the bioregional motto of “Don't Move!” (Snyder 2007: 98) and, second, a condemnation of living
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beyond one's immanent, day-to-day, and socio-natural relationships. Moreover, it is important to
note, these explanations sketch out a particular identification of not simply what an ecovillage
can or can't be to the exclusion of other places but also who can be its compatible practitioners to
the  exclusion  of  othered  subjects—50  blocks  is  too  big  for  a  sense  of  community,  and
embodiment as a transient person is incompatible with being an ecovillager. Thus, the question
of place-taking compels a question of the proper subject of that place.
Enright Ridge sought to address this by reducing the scale of the ecovillage and take root
in  a  place  already characterized  with  home ownership.  This  came at  the  cost,  though,  of  a
positive claim of identity. In the so-called “eco-refuge,” as Verstraeten and Verstraeten (2011)
call places like Enright Ridge, this is unavoidable: 
The Eco-refuges [are] faced to a complex of problems to overrule: how to guarantee  
freedom despite the organization of the refuge in order to establish social justice? How 
can the refuge be sustainable and at the same time create wellness for all? What about the
cross-cultural dialogue inside refuges and what about external relation with the world  
without?...Though the participants can belong to very different cultural traditions, the  
common Eco-refuge has to produce a collective identity so that any participant feels  
home and every participant can identify the Eco-refuge as the constancy of place with the
prime basis of sameness (786).
This  sameness,  however,  promotes  an  otherness  and  the  underlying  problem  of  difference
remains. The positive identity of an ecovillager as homeowner is only meaningful when put in
relation to the exclusion of the renter as outsider. The condition of sameness occurs precisely
because the others existing outside make sense of it;  the upholding of one representation of
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living is sensible only insofar as it can be differentiated from other representations of living. If
the  eventual  intent  of  all  of  the  places  like  Enright  Ridge,  then,  is  to  introduce  ecological
sustainability the world over, this dependency on substantive difference does not bode well to its
possibility. 
Even more so,  if  we orient  ourselves not  within the ecovillage but within the global
structure of hegemony, how does the ecovillage appear? In one word: marginal. This is, in fact,
the  only possibility  of  this  place-bound resistance.  Now,  it  is  not  as  if  ecovillagers  will  be
stopped in broad daylight by any brute force of state violence—indeed they might very well
continue  to  be  encouraged  by governmental  offices.  Still,  if  they  try to  take  place  as  they
conventionally have imagined, they will confront something like the diffuse effects of power that
Schenk (2006) had identified in the failure of Seminary Square: transient renters, bigness and
concentration of dilapidated urban areas, and so on. But what is being faulted is secondary to the
primary impossibility of the initial Seminary Square Eco-Village: that is, Seminary Square failed
not because of bigness or transience, but because power settled geographically forbids its own
spatial rearrangement into bioregional places.
To be an ecovillager, in other words, necessitates a marginalization of oneself from the
center, a marginalization that penetrates through from one's own worldview all the way down to
the actual bioregional practices. We had already seen this take place in the formation of new
cosmology—we can also see it in the desire for 'simple living'—this also appears to occur in
practice. The geography of Enright Ridge is deeply fragmented, situated between a forest and a
cemetery on a long, dead-end street with no commercial industry, no thoroughfare, and no rental
property.  Wrapped in bioregional  imaginations,  in  the dismantling of Seminary Square,  they
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were  confronted  with  'knowing  their  place'  in  compulsive,  systematic  relationships.  The
ecovillagers were forced to seek out the geographical margins of East Price Hill, to find refuge in
a fragmented collective of houses tucked away from view on Enright Avenue. Marginalism here
thus means that ecovillagers own property, pay taxes, work city jobs, and are wholly compliant
to the modern city and the forces of nation, state, and capital that permeate.
Moreover, the fact that their identity is relational also means that they are not simply what
upholds Enright Ridge. The ethic of loyalty to place, as Taylor notes, insists that we “behave in a
way consistent with an affirmation of the intrinsic value of all life forms, an ethics grounded in a
felt connection to all life, especially as it is manifested in the places we live” (2000: 67). The
sustainability of the ecovillage stems from its capacity to arrange itself spatially among those on
a street who feel no such ethic: as an internal study revealed, 1/3 of those living on Enright
Avenue are members,  1/3 are  supportive,  and 1/3 are  entirely indifferent  (Faherty 2014).  In
addition, a number of people in the CSA are simply local residents offering their land and not
members of Enright Ridge or participants in the work-share co-op. By virtue of an overarching
structure of power that compelled ecovillagers in East Price Hill to the margins, to be living in a
milieu of placelessness, among non-committal others, is a condition of the possibility to live-as-
if-in-place on Enright Avenue. They are living-as-if to the exclusion of those outside of this
imagined community.  This is the new reproduction of nation in Karatani's sense—the gift of
which is citizenship, reciprocated in the upholding of the norms of a particular and positive, but
always relational, identity.
Moreover, as I stated earlier, 'bioregion' as a kind of place is something we never actually
confront. What we are actually contesting in the practice of bioregionalism, as Wylie made clear,
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is always the dynamic margins:
Even in relatively isolatable 'systems,' what we all now take as a truism—that ecology is 
dynamism—any  distinctiveness,  stasis,  or  'balance'  ever  attained  or  discerned  is  
necessarily temporary, contingent, and relative. The turbulence of the littoral only makes 
unavoidably obvious what holds for all the natural world (2012: 314).
The bioregion as exclusionary unit is still necessarily implied in relation to boundary or ecotone
but without ever being verified; it is an assumption of bioregional practice, and yet, when we
turn to it, it melts into air.  Hence, it can hardly be said that the identity of the ecovillager is what
propagates Enright Ridge or that bioregion is what constitutes place; rather, 'practicing' place
actually arises at idiosyncratic points of contact between members and non-members, between
people and nature, on the margins with Capital-Nation-State at center. But that, like place, the
'reality' of Capital-Nation-State as worldview is hardly totally knowable. We live like the people
of Tlön, Borges' metaphor for any catchall world order, in a labyrinth “devised by men” which
we simultaneously “never quite grasp” (Borges 1962:  30).  What abides in the purely spatial
sense as ecotone also, as Enright Ridge has shown, abides here in the political sense. Enright
Ridge is not revolutionary but a marginal movement at the limit of our social imaginary, for such
radical aspirations as Seminary Square are doomed to an impasse on the way to practice, to
penetration by an organization of power imbued within both how we conceive and then actually
practice our spatial relations. Ecovillagers thus do not live in place here. One should recall that
place does not exist as such, only as a condition that is best understood as space qua diffference.
Hence, it is more accurate to say that ecovillagers, like us all, live marginally, in the difference
that we have come to represent as 'places.'
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What we then must  call  for  is  a  political  ontology that  is  able  to  truly interpret  and
confront the marginalized living-as-if-in-place and can set its task toward a 'way out.' In short,
we must call for a political analogy to the realization that bioregion is nothing but ecotone, that
place is nothing but pure difference. How could this be accomplished? I refer back to the model
of  Capital-Nation-State  and  the  varying  modes  of  exchange.  Whereas  capital  symbolizes
“indirect, impersonal, and abstract market exchange,” the state symbolizes centrality,  and the
nation stands for “imagined unity” (Boutry-Stadelmann 2009: 343), the extent to which we can
'deny' this social formation in the same way we can deny bioregion is the extent to which mode
of exchange D, or associationism, can become predominant. This entails a total remodeling of
the center based not around money, the state, or the nation, but pure contingency:
If universal suffrage by secret ballot, namely, parliamentary democracy, is the 
dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, the introduction of a lottery should be deemed the 
dictatorship of the proletariat. The association of associations or assozierter Verstand 
inexorably entails a center; yet the center is constantly replaced by the contingency; the 
centrality of the center is displaced in this manner. The center exists and does not exist at 
the same time. That is to say, it is the concrete form of the Kantian transcendental 
apperception X...Our ideal organization should assume the existence of hierarchy from 
the beginning, except that it introduces the election and lottery to escape the stagnation of
the power structure. Organization for any counteraction against state and capitalism must 
introduce within itself the device of introducing contingency in the magnetic power 
center. If not, it will be like the thing it intends to counter (Karatani 2005: 183-184).
Hence, the 'center' of a political ontology that can confront Capital-Nation-State is one that is
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structured around the center's perpetual displacement. There can then be no growing roots or a
nexus of any sort. There can be no cosmological arrangement or any other sense of world picture
confused  as  the  earth  or  the  universe  in  themselves.  There  can  only  be  that  which  most
immediately arrives in the problematic of the other: difference. 
How would we go about thinking of difference ontically? This, I argue, is the present task
of radical ecology. It begins as a skeptical solution to the aporia of place—that is, we accept as
our premise that space is indeed unanswerable, that it always exists beyond representation and
that any claim of 'knowing' space-in-itself is erroneous. What we do undoubtedly come to terms
with, on the other hand, is difference. But this is new recognition of difference is cannot be used
as a means for any asymmetrical relations or system of domination of the other. Rather, it is
difference celebrated as its own end. There is no universal referent; there is no assumed common
center. This system, in other words, expresses itself at every possible point only as singularity.
This, I argue, is the means by which we are able to collapse being and Being simultaenously with
the transversal differentiation between beings. As a result, an ontology of singularity is the total
extent to which the other can be 'freed' from its relation to the subject.
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IV. Conclusion
A Preliminary Sketch of a Place-of-Life
Jorge Luis Borges once wrote an essay entitled “A New Refutation of Time,” claiming to
have “glimpsed or foreseen a refutation of time, in which I myself do not believe, but which
regularly visits me at night and in the weary twilight with the illusory force of an axiom” (1962:
191). For Borges, this refutation stems from a consideration of the precarious position of the
subject in a  world that  appears as nothing to us but the 'now'.  How, in other  words,  do we
reconcile abstract time with the only apparent 'now?' Borges responds: the present, as the only
aspect of time that seemingly exists, must be either divisible or indivisible. He rules that the
present is not indivisible:
in such a case it would have no beginning to link it to the past nor end to link it to the 
future, nor even a middle,  since what has no beginning or end can have no middle;  
neither is it divisible, for in such a case it would consist of a part that was and another that
is not. Ergo, it does not exist (Borges 1962: 204).
One should recall the early exposition in Chapter 2 of Aristotle and Kant and the similarity of the
argument laid out here by Borges. Aristotle, after all, ruled that time was merely enumeration and
that it in fact does not exist outside of its possibility of being counted. He relied on the concept of
place to still assert that the universe existed irrespective of humans. In a similar way as Borges
outlines, though, it was asserted that place carries a similar problem as the present, in which it
can neither be indivisible, for its boundaries are always relatively defined to other places, nor can
it be divisible, for the All, the total constitution of places, exists no place, and hence cannot exist.
Thus, not only must time be refuted, but, in addition, space must also be refuted.
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Kant argued against such a position of pure subjectivity in saying that these concepts do
indeed exist, though not necessarily knowable as such. Rather, what the human subject arrives at
is  always  a  representation  of  time  and  space.  This  leads,  however,  into  the  problematic  of
difference, which is essentially the ethical problematic of the other. How, in other words, do we
square variegated representations  in  such a  way as  to  not  marginalize  some for  the sake  of
others? How do we live together in difference and simultaneous cohesion without electing to a
system  of  power—say,  Capital-Nation-State—that  wrongfully  and  erroneously  presumes
commonality and appeal to an exclusionary and oppressive center? 
There are a series of steps that I can recommend. The first step resembles Enright Ridge:
to live on the margins, politically, cosmologically, and spatially. Moreover, it is the first condition
of  bioregionalism—that  condition  that  admits  a  world  beyond  oneself  and  subsequently
marginalizes the ego and claims reverence to something that lies beyond. In doing so, the sense
of a dominant position over nature drops and 'we are natural' in the very first instance. Moreover,
a humility sets in that, like Kant, forces a critique of our precarious position as subjects. We do
not assume center, and hence, we first acknowledge our relation to meaning as always indirect,
as purely representation. In his analysis of Christian intentional communities, Veling mirrors this
same sentiment:
The word of God—we never really get it, do we? We never really hear it, or say it, or 
write it, or do it. Yet we move toward it—we feel its pull and its power—and we find 
ourselves,  suddenly,  on  the  way:  going,  listening,  writing,  doing,  hoping.  Marginal  
hermeneutics is a hermeneutics of 'being on the way' (Veling 2002: 178).
For Veling, this sense of “marginal heremeneutics” is rooted in a rabbinic tradition long since
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marginalized by the incoming of Christianity, during which the adherence to “law” was replaced
by incarnate divinity (Veling 2002: 157). The living Christ, it seemed, nullified the interpretative
practice  of  the  text,  and  all  of  the  “gaps  and  enigmas  that  generated  the  rabbinic  play  of
interpretation  were  now  finally  closed  and  illuminated”  (Veling  2002:  157).  No  more
interpretation was necessary: the Messiah had come, and the Word was realized not as something
always  escaping  but  directly  within  this  world.  The  Truth,  in  other  words,  is  real  and
immediately identifiable  as  such.  Christ  is  the  embodiment  of  Truth;  Christians  are  directly
liberated through incarnate Truth that is Christ. In contrast, the “realm of the Hebrew word is the
realm of being and reality...The movement is not to metaphysics but to interpretation, not to
transcendence but to textuality” (Veling 2002: 156). There is no seeing beyond, no God-in-flesh,
but only interpretation, a hermeneutics wrought specifically from the loss and separation from
the  Word  ever  since  the  breaking  of  the  tablets.  The  rabbinic  tradition  sees  the  word,  as
fragmented and departed as it is, as the only way in which we can live, and hence the practice of
and attention to hermeneutics is essential to being. In doing so, however:
...the rabbis are not commenting on the book they have read; rather, they are reading the 
book in their commentary...This privileges process over product and values the ongoing 
event of interpretation. The rabbis can only read as they write, such that their commentary
is the text they are reading. This is a difficult notion to grasp, for we typically think of 
commentary  as  something  we  write  after  reading  a  text,  something  secondary  or  
subsequent to the text. However, the rabbis confuse this opposition between reading and 
writing, such that one never knows where the text ends and the commentary begins, for 
the two are closely interdependent and woven together (Veling 2002: 148).
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The rabbinic tradition is hence always already marginal with no direct access to Truth. What
appears  is  only  Truth's  sideways  and  indirect  interpretations,  reflections—the  art  of
hermeneutics. The first step toward the political ontology is to acknowledge a reality that appears
as  nothing other  than  these  representations  and to  accordingly marginalize  one's  position  as
subject to that of the hermeneutic, the interpreter of the book.
The second step, however, is to depart from Veling's return to Christianity through the
rabbinic tradition and any other path, such as bioregionalism, which, after self-marginalization,
seeks  to  subsume humans either  under  a  scientific  paradigm or  the  mystical  guide  of  some
Eternal spirit. At great pains this must be avoided, for 'We are Nature' is in this sense no less
debilitating than to say 'we dominate nature:' both only confirm the world picture and remain
totally non-cognizant of what William James called “the trail of the human serpent” that is “thus
over everything” (1904). “Perhaps the central problem in bioregionalism,” as Taylor points out,
“is that of fluid boundaries and the difficulty of demarcating what constitutes a bioregion...what
are bioregional provinces but human constructions, given the many possible criteria and the need
for  humans  to  make  judgments  about  their  relative  importance?”  (2000:61-62).  This  claim
however falls upon deaf ears in both the scientific and spiritual environmentalist communities.
First, it is felt when positivists strive to 'know' the world by way of modeling it, and, second, it is
felt when, in the Second North American Bioregional Congress, environmentalists argued over
whether  or  not  non-human  organisms  should  be  allowed  to  voice  their  concerns  at  such  a
gathering. From the science of coal combustion to the inclusion of animals at the round table in
the quest to draw up a solution, the world as picture arrives first as tragedy, then as farce.
The third step is  to build toward an ontology that recognizes place not as space  qua
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difference  but  as  pure  difference.  At  this  moment,  difference  no  longer  expresses  itself
specifically as difference anymore since there is must be no referent. Instead, what constitutes
this ontology is a multitude of singularities. This is what Agamben calls 'whatever singularity.' In
The Coming  Community,  Agamben sets  forth  in  explaining  this  concept  by first  concerning
himself with the scholastic notion of quodlibet: “Quodlibet ens is not 'being, it does not matter
which,' but rather 'being such that it always matters.' The Latin always already contains, that is, a
reference to the will (libet)” (Agamben 1993: 1). Hence, 'whatever' is not in the sense that any
instance  of  life  will  do  in  the  aspiration  toward  a  coming  community,  but  rather,  he  says,
“[w]hatever is constituted...by the indifference of the common and the proper, of the genus and
the species, of the essential and the accidental. Whatever is the thing with all its properties, none
of  which,  however,  constitutes,  difference” (Agamben 1993:  19).  Singularity here  no longer
relies on power center, and it does not rely on any anterior form to explain or politically mediate
itself but it is instead, directly,  life.  More specifically,  as Agamben would later write in  The
Highest Poverty, “It is not a matter so much of applying a form (or norm) to life, but of living
according to that form, that is of a life that, in its sequence, makes itself that very form, coincides
with it” (Agamben 2013: 99).  In doing so, “Singularity is  thus freed from the dilemma that
obliges knowledge to choose between the ineffability of the individual and the intelligibility of
the  universal”  (Agamben 1993:  1).  In  the  coming community,  there  is  hence  no  distinction
between form and life, there is only form-of-life.
In both a spatial and metaphysical sense, this can only be done, however, by submitting
oneself to the marginal boundaries. Agamben indeed admits this point:
Whatever  adds  to  singularity  only  an  emptiness,  only  a  threshold:  Whatever  is  a  
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singularity plus an empty space...But a singularity plus an empty space can only be a pure
exteriority, a pure exposure. Whatever, in this sense, is the event of an outside. What is 
thought in the architranscendental quodlibet is, therefore, what is most difficult to think: 
the absolutely non-thing experience of a pure exteriority...It is important here that the  
notion of the 'outside' is expressed in many European languages by a word that means 'at 
the door'...The  outside  is another space that resides beyond a determinate space,  but  
rather, it is the passage, the exteriority that gives it access—in a word, it is its face, its 
eidos. The threshold is not, in this sense, another thing with respect to the limit; it is, so to
speak, the experience of the limit itself, the experience of being-wthin an outside. This 
ek-stasis is the gift that singularity gathers from the empty hands of humanity (Agamben 
1993: 67).
To be at the door is a fundamental condition of Karatani's mode of exchange D. Though Karatani
notes that the “ideal organization should assume the existence of hierarchy from the beginning,”
this hierarchy is intentionally broken by submitting us all to marginal positions in assocationism
precisely  because  associationsim  requires  the  absolving  of  the  money  nexus  through  the
designation of pure contingency in its place at center (Kartani 2005: 184). Indeed, as Karatani
knows, traversal movement toward exteriority is the only place in which one can perform a
transcritique, in which one can speak to the transcendental structure of being by virtue of the
pronounced parallax, of the in-between. To speak of the parallax gap is to be in transition from
the inside to the outside, to be in exodus.
We must then revise the narrative of Veling and marginal hermeneutics, for this is still
stuck in the rabbinic tradition at the point of exodus, of 'being on the way' toward God once
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more. The nexus of God, while inaccessible, is still predominant, and, as a result, intentional
Christian  communities  do  not  exist  as  whatever  singularities  but  constantly returning to  the
center. Veling believes, after all, that “intentional communities need to understand their need for
institution: for the maintenance of their continuity, for preservation of their identity, and for the
possibilities of networking over against the threat of fragmentation” (Veling 2002: 13). While
marginal hermeneutics allowed us a way to genuinely reflect, it must now be abandoned. “If
humans could...not be-thus in this or that particular biography, but be only the thus, their singular
exteriority and their face,  then they would for the first  time enter into a community without
presuppositions  and  without  subjects,  into  a  communication  without  the  incommunicable”
(Agamben 1993: 64). Hence, in the coming community there is no more referent; there is no
Abrahamic, incommunicable God. As Saidel explains Agamben, “language is intimately related
to our ethos—both habit and dwelling—our human form-of-life, and infancy is the transcendental
condition of our entrance (or not) into language that enables us to think a community with no
presuppositions,  in  which  singular  beings  are  exposed  to  the  very fact  of  communicability”
(2014: 171). 
Place, like form, is here translated to the point of whatever singularity. The two must
become indistinguishable in the “coming” political ontology. As there is form-of-life, there must
also be place-of-life. Place has thus shifted in the coming community from space qua difference
to difference, and now to the taking-place purely indistinguishable from life and form, all united
as singularity. In an explicitly moral sense,
God or the good or the place does not take place, but is the taking-place of the entities, 
their innermost exteriority. The being-worm of the worm, the being-stone of the stone, is 
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divine.  That  the  world  is,  that  something can  appear  and have  a  face,  that  there  is  
exteriority and non-latency as the determination and the limit of every thing: this is the 
good. Thus, precisely its being irreparably in the world is what transcends and exposes 
every worldly entity. Evil, on the other hand, is the reduction of the taking-place of things
to fact like others, the forgetting of the transcendence inherent in the very taking-place of 
things. With respect to these things, however, the good is not somewhere else; it is simply
the point at which they grasp the taking-place proper to them, at which they touch their 
own non-transcendent matter. In this sense—and only in this sense—the good must be 
defined as a self-grasping of evil,  and salvation as the coming of the place to itself  
(Agamben 1993: 15).
Goodness is hence not an appeal to or a measuring of oneself against the godhead; goodness is
not dwelling poetically. Goodness is the self-grasping of evil, or, rather, the profane; it is the
celebration of not  how or why life  is  but  that  it  is.  Place is  hence process.  It  is  space  qua
difference in the truest sense. But place is also not a condition or control: place does not take
place—it is the taking-place. Place is the being-such in the spatial sense; it is its own belonging;
it is quodlibet. Agamben points to the heresy of Amalric of Bena who dared to say that “God is
all  in  all:”  “God  is  in  every  thing  as  the  place  in  which  every  thing  is,  or  rather  as  the
determination and the 'topia' of every entity” (1993: 14). The transcendental is hence not the
supreme entity hanging over this world, and it is not, after all, the hermeneutics of the rabbis—
rather, it is “the taking-place of every being” (1993: 15). The transcendental is, in other words,
that  the  rabbis  speak,  that  they  are.  Agamben  takes  this  sentiment  directly  from  Tractatus
Philosophico-Logicus: “It is not how things are in the world that is mystical, but that it exists”
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(Wittgenstein [1953] 2009: 6.44). To realize this is to speak sacredly and profanely all the same;
it is to speak on the margins, on the way outside, at the door, but to not look beyond for form or
place,  instead  recognize  it  as  life  as  such.  Borges  ends  “A New  Refutation  of  Time”  by
lamenting, “The world, unfortunately, is real. I unfortunately, am Borges” (1962: 205). This is
xenophobia setting into the mystical; it is the fear of solipsism that cannot overcome its suspicion
of nihilism. It is the fear of world picture as merely specter, as both there and not there. The
intent of place-of-life in the coming community is to elide this anxiety: to no longer to live-as-if
but to live-as-such. This is the good: it is to be in the taking-place of whatever singularity. 
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APPENDIX
Figure 1: The Neighborhoods of Cincinnati 
Source: “The Social Areas of Cincinnati” (2000)
For quick reference, 2 is West End, 43 is East Price Hill, 31 is Avondale, 10 is Corryville
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Figure 2: Imago Earth Center
Source: Sizemore (2004) 
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Figure 3: Seminary Square Eco-Village
Source: Sizemore (2004)
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Figure 4: Enright Ridge in Comparison To Seminary Square
Sources: Seminary Square map, Siezmore (2004); Enright Ridge map, Loezir (2011)
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Figure 5: Carrying Capacity
Source: Taylor (2000), originally published in the New Catalyst Bioregional Series.
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Table 1: Price Hill Will Mottos and Goals
Source: Sizemore (2004)—note that the education goal was not articulated at the time of
Sizemore's research.
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